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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)U) and Utah R. App. P. 5.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the trial court misapplied the rules of contract

interpretation to the Pricing Optimization and Audit Services Agreement (the
"Agreement") by failing to harmonize all of the provisions of the Agreement and by
adopting an interpretation that relieved Plaintiff/Appellee iDrive Logistics, LLC
("iDrive") of its obligation to perform pricing optimization services under the Agreement.

•

Standard of Review: An appellate court's "review of the district court's
summary judgment decision is de novo." Nevares v. ML.S., 2015 UT 34, if9, 345 P.3d
719. "If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, [appellate courts] accord its

e

construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness standard."

Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

2.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that

iDrive "performed or was in the process of performing" its "pricing optimization"
obligations under the Agreement, and thereby granting summary judgment for iDrive and
denying summary judgment for Defendant/Appellant IntegraCore, LLC ("IntegraCore"),
where there is substantial undisputed evidence showing iDrive failed to perform.
Standard of Review: An appellate court's "review of the district court's
summary judgment decision is de novo." Nevares, 2015 UT 34 at iJ9. "In the context of
cross-motions for summary judgment, [appellate courts] examine each motion separately,
1
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viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party." Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ,r10, 94
P.3d 179.

3.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred by concluding the undisputed facts

established that Integra.Core, rather than iDrive, materially breached the Agreement.
Standard of Review: An appellate court's "review of the district court's
summary judgment decision is de novo." Nevares, 2015 UT 34 at ,r9.
4.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment for

IntegraCore on iDrive's claim that IntegraCore breached the Agreement when it stopped
using iDrive's United States Postal Service ("USPS") account for USPS shipments.
Standard of Review: An appellate court's "review of the district court's
summary judgment decision is de novo." Id.
Preservation of Issues: These issues were preserved in: (1) IntegraCore's Motion

and Memoranda for Summary Judgment on iDrive's Contract Claims, filed March 6,
2015, and June 16, 2015 (R.1929-1974, 4087-4126); (2) IntegraCore's Opposition to
iDrive's UPS Summary Judgment Motion, filed May 4, 2015 (R.2907-2985); and (3)
IntegraCore' s Opposition to iDrive' s Summary Judgment Motion on IntegraCore' s
Contract Claims, filed May 4, 2015. (R.2827-2873)
DETERMINATIVE LAW

There are no determinative statutes, constitutional provisions, or rules.

2
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•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This is a contract action. IntegraCore provides supply chain management and
fulfillment solutions, including packaging, warehouse and distribution services. As part
~

of its services, IntegraCore commonly contracts with parcel carriers such as United
Parcel Service ("UPS"), Federal Express· (''FedEx") and USPS. (R.1936) iDrive is a
consulting firm that purports to provide "optimization" services for businesses looking to
reduce their shipping transportation costs, including by representing businesses in
negotiating contracts with parcel carriers. (R.193 7.) Through the Agreement, IntegraCore
contracted with iDrive to, inter alia, provide expert services to reduce its shipping costs
and optimize its Carrier contracts. (R.1937-38; see also Agreement, attached as Add. E.)
Although this case implicates a number of principles of contract law, the primary

i)

issue is also the most basic: whether iDrive is entitled to compensation under the
"pricing optimization" provision of the Agreement where there is substantial evidence
iDrive did not perform the "pricing optimization services" it was hired to provide. This
concept - the requirement of bargain and exchange - is a foundational tenet of contract
law. Nevertheless, the trial court accepted iDrive's argument that IntegraCore was
required to pay iDrive "regardless of whether or not iDrive actually performed the
optimization services." This case, then, is ultimately about whether IntegraCore is
required to pay iDrive millions of dollars for doing nothing, in contravention of both the
intent of the parties and long standing principles of contract law.

3
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Course of Proceedin2s
A.

Pleadings and Early Proceedings

iDrive filed a Complaint on March 15, 2013, asserting claims for (1) breach of
contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) unjust
enrichment; (4) constructive trust; (5) conversion; and (6) fraud. (R.13-27) Only iDrive's
contract claims are currently pending. iDrive voluntarily dismissed its conversion and
fraud claims with prejudice after IntegraCore filed dispositive motions to dismiss these
G;t

claims. (R.114-116, 756-58) The trial court granted summary judgment for IntegraCore
on May 29, 2015 dismissing iDrive's constructive trust and unjust enrichment claims

with prejudice. (R.3997-4002)
iDrive alleged identical breaches in support of both its express and implied
contract claims, including that: (I) "IntegraCore failed to flow all significant logistics
decisions through iDrive"; (2) IntegraCore failed to timely provide iDrive with
information regarding material changes in its arrangements with Carriers, both before and
after changes were made; (3) "IntegraCore failed to compensate iDrive for changes in its
arrangements with Carriers as required by the terms of the 2011 Agreement"; and (4)
"IntegraCore diverted USPS shipments that were required to be made on the iDrive
negotiated USPS contract, and instead secretly and without iDrive's knowledge or
consent made those shipments using a different USPS contract and rate." (R.14-15)
iDrive claims damages on its contract claims, based on an expert report from
Richard S. Hoffman ("Hoffman"): (a) for "lost commissions best estimated to be between
$1,411,000 and $3,547,000 associated with savings IntegraCore realized on its UPS
4
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service"; and (b) for "lost profits best estimated to be $943,000 based on IntegraCore's"
USPS shipments using a non-Drive USPS account. 1 (R.1954, 2228, 2238)
IntegraCore filed an Answer and Counterclaim on May 7, 2013, and an Amended
Answer and Counterclaim on February 7, 2014. (R.71-98, 261-294) In its Amended

II

Counterclaim, IntegraCore brought claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) tortious interference with economic
relations; and (4) misappropriation of trade secrets.2 (R.261-94)

ti)

IntegraCore' s claim for breach of contract was based upon iDrive' s failure to
fulfill its contractual obligations as Vice President ("VP") of Logistics for IntegraCore
and to provide pricing optimization services for lntegraCore. (R.281-87) IntegraCore's
claim for breach of the implied covenant was based upon, inter alia, iDrive's demand for
money for optimization services it never provided, iDrive's refusal to seek better Carrier
i}

contracts for IntegraCore, and iDrive's misuse of IntegraCore's confidential information.
(R.287-88)
B.

Summary Judgment Proceedings Regarding Pricing Optimization Agreement

Following discovery, on March 6, 2015, iDrive and lntegraCore filed crossmotions for partial summary judgment on the parties' contract claims. (R.1442-2241)

1

IntegraCore moved to exclude Hoffman's reports and testimony, and the reports and
testimony ofiDrive's "industry expert," Glenn Gooding, on March 20, 2015. (R.22512408) The trial court entered written orders denying both motions on November 30,
2015. (R.4741-4755)
2

IntegraCore's claims for tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets are
not at issue in this appeal, but remain pending before the Court.
5
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1.

iDrive's Summary Judgment Motions

iDrive filed two overlapping summary judgment motions on the contract claims.
(R.1482-84, 1494-97) First, iDrive filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its
own claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing arising from IntegraCore's entry into a contract with UPS in October of 2011.
(R.1494-97) iDrive claimed the undisputed facts established IntegraCore breached the
Agreement in October of 2011 by failing to inform iDrive of negotiations with UPS;
failing to allow iDrive to manage negotiations with UPS; and failing to pay iDrive 38%
of the savings under the October 2011 UPS agreement. (R.1494-1546)
iDrive filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment on IntegraCore's
claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. (R.1482-84) In support, iDrive incorporated its arguments from its other
summary judgment motion, but also argued lntegraCore's claims were barred by the
exculpatory clause in the Agreement. (R.1442-81, 1483)
2.

IntegraCore's Summary Judgment Motion

IntegraCore sought summary judgment on iDrive' s claims for breach of contract
and breach of the implied covenant. (R.1820-23) In support, IntegraCore argued iDrive
was required to perform the agreed-upon pricing optimization services, and that
IntegraCore must derive savings from such services before iDrive was entitled to
compensation therefor under Section 3(a)( 1) of the Agreement. (R.1821) IntegraCore
further argued the undisputed facts established iDrive did not fulfill its obligations to
provide pricing optimization services; that IntegraCore derived no savings from iDrive' s
6
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purported optimization; and that, therefore, iDrive was not entitled receive compensation
under the Agreement. (R.1821,1957-72) IntegraCore also sought dismissal ofiDrive's
claim for breach of the implied covenant on the additional basis that it was wholly
duplicative of its express contract claim. (R.1972-73)

3.

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Rulings

The trial court held oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment on
August 12, 2015. (R.4259-60) After argument at the hearing, the trial court granted
iDrive's two motions for summary judgment on liability and denied IntegraCore's motion
for summary judgment. (R.4388-89)
iDrive served three separate written proposed summary judgment orders on
IntegraCore on August 27, 2015. (R.4316-4331) IntegraCore filed an objection to the
form of the proposed summary judgment orders and sought clarification of the scope of
i)

the trial court's rulings made on August 12, 2015. (R.4261-4293, 4435-4449)
The trial court overruled IntegraCore's objections and entered the Summary
Judgment Orders submitted by iDrive on September 29, 2015. (R.4498-99, 4481-97) The
Orders include: (1) Order Granting iDrive's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing Arising from IntegraCore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement, (R.4491-97)
(attached as Add. A); (2) Order Granting iDrive's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on IntegraCore' s First Counterclaim and Second Counterclaim, (R.4487-90) (attached as
Add. B); (3) Order Denying IntegraCore's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

{iJ

iDrive's Contract Claims, (R.4481-86) (attached as Add. C) (collectively, these three
7
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Orders are the "Summary Judgment Orders~'). The trial court also entered a separate
Ruling re: Objection to Form of Summary Judgment Orders ("Clarification Order"),
which provided some additional detail clarifying the bases for its rulings in the Summary
Judgment Orders. (R.4498-4509) (attached as Add. D.)
C.

Summary Judgment Proceedings Regarding USPS

IntegraCore sought summary judgment on iDrive's claim that IntegraCore
breached the Agreement when it stopped using iDrive's USPS account. (R.1821)
IntegraCore argued there was no provision of the Agreement requiring IntegraCore to use
iDrive's USPS account for any period of time, and that iDrive's damage theory for USPS
was not supported by the Agreement. (R.1970-71, 4110-15) The Order Denying
IntegraCore's Summary Judgment Motion did not address USPS at all. (Add. C.) After
IntegraCore requested clarification, the trial court stated only that "IntegraCore's motion
for summary judgment was denied, effectively preserving the issue for future litigation
and trial." (Add. D, at 4.)
D.

Interlocutory Petition

lntegraCore filed its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal from the Summary
Judgment Orders and Clarification Order on October 19, 2015. (R.4523-25) The Petition
was granted on November 16, 2015. (R.4642-43.) The trial court granted IntegraCore's
Motion to Stay proceedings in the trial court pending the outcome of this Interlocutory
Appeal on February 2, 2016.

8
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Statement of Facts

I.

The Agreement

A.

Summary ofPricing Optimization Terms

1.

iDrive and IntegraCore entered into the Agreement on January 13, 2011.

(R.1937; Agreement, Add. E.)
2.

The Agreement identifies the "Pricing Optimization Service[s]" that iDrive

was required to provide to IntegraCore as follows:
CUSTOMER [IntegraCore] appoints iDRIVE (Stephen Chase or
mutually agreed upon person) as Vice President (VP) of Logistics and is
tasked to help CUSTOMER with all modes of transportation and will
report directly to Ted Broman, CUSTOMER CEO and/or OWNER. All
significant logistics decisions will flow through iDRIVE for review. As
VP of logistics, iDrive will also manage the contract negotiation/
optimization process with Carrier(s), as well as the contract
maintenance process, on CUSTOMER's behalf. This process includes
collecting and analyzing CUSTOMER's current parcel shipping data,
pricing and Carrier contracts, establishing negotiation parameters with
the CUSTOMER; issuing Request for Proposals (RFP) to the Carriers;
collecting and analyzing the Carriers' responses to the RFP; negotiating
pricing, terms and conditions with the Carriers; presenting analysis on
Carrier proposals to the CUSTOMER. Final selection of a Carrier(s) is
the CUSTOMER'S decision....
(Agreement,§ l(a).)
3.
€ii

iDrive's duties as the VP of Logistics for IntegraCore were further outlined

in Section 2 of the Agreement to include at least the following:
•

"Spend 2 days in IntegraCore's Operations learning current logistic
practices and operations," and "conduct 2 additional visits over the next
2 quarters."

•

"Work directly with carriers regarding carrier agreements, services and
strategic changes."
9
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•

"Monitor transportation cost trends by mode and by carrier."

•

"Help find, interview and recruit Director of Logistics as needed," and
"support and direct as needed him/her."

•

"Provide, as needed, recommendations for logistics changes."

(Agreement, §2.)
4.

iDrive requested the appointment as VP of Logistics to remove any

barriers to iDrive's ability to directly negotiation with the Carriers. (R.1942)
5.

The Agreement also independently names iDrive as an "agent" for

IntegraCore. (Agreement, §7(b).)

6.

iDrive's compensation for providing the above-described pricing

optimization services under the Agreement is as follows:
(a)

iDrive's Fees. For providing the services set forth by this
agreement, iDrive shall be [sic] receive from CUSTOMER
the following:
1.

Pricing Optimization Service: iDRIVE shall receive a
retainer of two thousand one hundred and eighty-five
dollars ($2, 185) per month for seven (7) months
beginning February 1, 2011. iDRIVE shall receive
thirty-eight percent (38%) of savings that the
CUSTOMER [Inte~aCore] derives from iDRIVE'S
optimization service. All improvements made to any
of CUSTOMER'S contract(s) with Carrier(s) between
the signature date on this Agreement and the end of the
Agreement term are considered to be the result of
iDRIVE'S optimization service. For the purposes of
calculating savings from iDRIVE'S optimization
efforts with the Carrier(s), iDRIVE and CUSTOMER
agree that CUSTOMER'S current rates, incentives and
terms will be used as the benchmark. CUSTOMER'S
benchmark data will be used as the basis for
calculating savings attributable to iDRIVE'S Pricing
Optimization service.
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(Agreement, §3(a)(l) (emphasis added).)
GiP

7.

The "Agreement Term" for pricing optimization services was as follows:
For compensation purposes the term of this Agreement for Pricing
Optimization Services will be three (3) years from the date that the
CUSTOMER executes an initial or new revision of an existing
Agreement(s) with the Carriers. Any new Carrier agreement signed
by CUSTOMER during a period of 3 years after the execution date
of this agreement shall be deemed to be based on iDRIVE'S
optimization efforts, whether negotiated directly with Carrier(s) by
iDRIVE, CUSTOMER or any other party and will be billable for 36
months from new carrier agreement date ....

(Agreement, p. 2.)
8.

The Agreement states it "may not be waived, repealed, altered or amended

in whole or in part except by an instrument in writing executed by authorized
representatives of each of the parties." (Agreement, §7(d).)
9.
@

Shaun Rothwell ("Rothwell"), Chief Executive Officer of iDrive, testified

that there is no written instrument purporting to waive, repeal, alter or amend any
provision or obligation of the Agreement. (R.1941)
B.

The Parties' Intent for the Pricing Optimization Service Obligation

10.

Ted Broman ("Broman"), Chief Executive Officer of IntegraCore, testified

regarding his expectations for the pricing optimization services iDrive agreed to provide:
As far as I understand, optimization services goes back to the value
promise of iDrive, which is they will bring expertise, knowledge,
broad industry experience, tools, on and on ... to drive the value for
our benefit, for IntegraCore's benefit, and it will be basically found
money and that there will be net new money brought to the table that
we would in no way get on our own. And that is optimization, that
they take something that exists currently and it takes it to a level that
there is no-you know, they through their effort and work take it to
a level that there's no way that we would get to on our own.
11
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(R.1937) Broman continued, "And if they did that, then we would give them-we would
share that [the savings] with him [iDrive]." (R.1938)
11.

Rothwell testified as iDrive's Rule 30(b)(6) designee that he understood the

Agreement required iDrive to provide "value" to IntegraCore in the form of "dollars"
IntegraCore "otherwise would not have obtained but for iDrive's involvement." (R.1938)
12.

Stephen Chase ("Chase"), who signed the Agreement as president of

iDrive, testified to a similar understanding: "That's why our customers signed us on.
Our commitment is: We will find savings for you. Even ifwe don't-if we don't, you
don't pay us anything. You'll only pay us when you save money." (R.4096-97, 4132)
II.

iDrive's Failure to Perform its Obligations Under the Agreement.
A.

Early conduct.

13.

IntegraCore appointed Chase as VP of Logistics of IntegraCore. (R.1941)

14.

In January of 2011, Rothwell emailed Broman a resume for Thad Haderlie

("Haderlie"). IntegraCore interviewed and hired Thad Haderlie ("Haderlie") to serve as
freight SBU manager on February 10, 2011. (R.1942)
15.

When the Agreement was executed, IntegraCore had carrier agreements in

place with UPS (executed September 2008) and with FedEx (executed in 2009).
(R.1941)
16.

On February 10, 2011, IntegraCore arranged meetings at IntegraCore's

Utah offices with UPS and FedEx. For the UPS meeting, Broman, Haderlie and Chase
represented IntegraCore, and Jennifer Trujillo ("Trujillo") and Shawn Orton represented
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9

UPS. (R.1942) For the FedEx meeting, Broman, Haderlie and Chase met with Kurt
Spiers ("Spiers"), IntegraCore's account manager for Fed Ex. (R.1944)
17.

The primary purpose of the February 2011 meetings with UPS and Fed Ex

was to introduce Chase as IntegraCore's VP of Logistics and to notify UPS and FedEx
that Chase was would be responsible for all contractual negotiations and other contractual
issues. (R.1943-44)
18.

Notwithstanding the obligations under Section 2 of the Agreement, Chase

did not visit IntegraCore's offices again after the February 2011 meetings. (R.1944)
19.

On February 21, 2011, Carl Hutchinson, for iDrive, sent a memorandum

analyzing IntegraCore' s agreements with UPS and Fed Ex, and identifying discounts and
incentives that might be available to IntegraCore from UPS and Fed Ex. (R.1944)

B.

iDrive'sfailure to pursue lntegraCore's interests with UPS

20.

From approximately February through April of 2011, Trujillo and Chase

had a couple of phone conversions regarding UPS' s current agreement with lntegraCore,
and a conference call in late April 2011 or early May 2011. (R.1945)
21.

On May 3, 2011, Chase sent Trujillo an email outlining pricing requests for

IntegraCore. (R.1945)
22.

Trujillo testified that she interpreted this email as requesting "incentive

(j)

changes," rather than a Request For Proposal ("RFP"), because it lacked the detail,
characteristics and formality she expected of an RFP from her 14 years career at UPS.
(R.1945-46)
23.

Ms. Trujillo testified that she never received an RFP from anyone on behalf
13
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of IntegraCore, including Chase. (R.1946)
24.

With respect to the May 3, 2011 incentive request, Trujillo testified that she

®)

determined that "what UPS had in place was competitive and consistent with the volume
of revenue we were getting from IntegraCore at that time." Thus, "no additional
incentives were due." (R.1946)
25.

Trujillo responded to Chase's May 3, 2011 email on May 11, 2011:
I have received the requests and am reviewing internally how we want
to pursue. I am continuing to work closely with Thad [Haderlie] to
understand the needs of lntegraCore and how we will continue to
provide a valuable [sic] partnership moving forward. At this time I do
not have a proposal. At this time I do not have a timeline when you will
receive a proposal back. I am still mapping out the processes and
supply chain of IntegraCore.

(R.1946-4 7)
26.

Trujillo testified she later notified Chase that she "had evaluated their

current agreement and, based on the characteristics of their [IntegraCore' s] business, their

<8

[IntegraCore's] shipping today with UPS, that I would not be making any changes to
their current agreement." (R.1947)
qj

27.

Trujillo received no response from Chase. (R.1947)

28.

Trujillo had no further interaction with Chase, ~ - Trujillo also never had

any contact with Rothwell or Hutchinson. (R.1947)
29.

There is no evidence that anyone associated with lntegraCore told Trujillo

or others at UPS not to work with Chase. Trujillo further indicated she would have
worked with Chase if he had tried. (R.1947, 1948)
30.

iDrive claims in the summer of 2011, Haderlie orally informed iDrive he
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"preferred to take the lead in the negotiations with UPS," and that iDrive conceded to
"step[] back to allow Mr. Haderlie to run point in those negotiations." (R.2934-36.)
Both ofHaderlie's alleged requests are disputed by IntegraCore. (R.2934-36.)
31.

Rothwell testified that Haderlie was not qualified and lacked the experience

necessary to negotiate and optimize Carrier contracts for IntegraCore. Specifically,
Rothwell testified Haderlie "[l]acked skills in contract structure, negotiations, auditing,
[and] data management reporting[.]" (R.1948)
32.

Broman testified that he expected Chase to negotiate and optimize all of

IntegraCore's Carrier contracts as set forth in the Agreement. (R.1948)

il

33.

Trujillo testified that her interactions with Haderlie involved only

operational issues through at least October 2011. (R.1866-68)
34.
fj

Hutchinson testified that Rothwell told him in July of 2011 that no one was

negotiating with UPS or FedEx on behalf of IntegraCore (including Haderlie). Yet, no
one at iDrive made any effort to contact UPS or Fed Ex. (R.2956)

C.

IntegraCore's new contracts with UPS without iDrive's involvement

35.

In October of 2011, Haderlie informed Broman he was going to contact

UPS and Fed Ex to see if there were any negotiations occurring on IntegraCore's
contracts because he had not heard from Chase. After contacting Trujillo and Spiers,
Haderlie notified Broman that "UPS and Fed Ex are not currently in contact with anyone
from iDrive." (R.1948)
36.

Trujillo testified that Haderlie stated in October of 2011, "My contract is

three years old, c'mon, my business has grown substantially, what can you do about
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that?" (R.1949)
37.

Trujillo testified that, at the time, she took IntegraCore's:
current agreement, which was three years old-had been implemented
in September of 2008-and started to evaluate the characteristics of
their [IntegraCore's] business. They had grown substantially, and I
stayed consistent to looking at that. Then knowing what the
competition was doing in the marketplace in my particular area of Utah,
I started looking for areas where we may be able to make some
improvements based on those type of characteristics and the anticipated
business that would come to UPS as well. I put in a request for a
proposal with my pricing group. I requested specific incentives that I
believed would be competitive with a customer of that type of revenue
size and characteristics of service levels and volume. I received a
contract proposal approved back from my pricing group, and ...
provided it to Thad for review and, ultimately, we signed it and put it in
place. There was really no negotiation; meaning I didn't go back and
forth, I didn't make changes to that contract. As I brought it out is how
we implemented it.

(R.1949)
3 8.

IntegraCore' s contract with UPS changed effective October 29, 2011.

(R.1949)
39.

Trujillo testified that in preparing the October 2011 agreement, she "never

referenced" Chase's May 3, 2011 email, and that iDrive had no involvement UPS's
decision to review the September 2008 agreement or to offer a new contract in October
2011. (R.1949)
40.

Trujillo confirmed there was no negotiation, but rather she used her

"experience and what [she] knew to be competitive in the marketplace at that time based
on the customer's growth." (R.1949-50)
41.

iDrive' s industry expert, Glen Gooding, opined, "[h]ad IntegraCore

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

attempted to negotiate the terms of the October 2011 proposal with UPS, IntegraCore
would have received more favorable terms than those set forth in the October 29, 2011
agreement." (R.1950)
42.
•

Gooding further testified that he was not aware of any fact that would have

precluded Chase from pursuing the more favorable terms from UPS that Gooding thought
were available to IntegraCore by October 2011. (R.1951)

D.

iDrive fails to utilize optimization efforts with Fed Ex or other Carriers

43.

IntegraCore's 2009 contract with Fed Ex has been in place since 2009 with

no changes. (R.1951.)
44.

After the February 2011 meeting, Spiers testified that he could not recall (a)

Chase ever calling him; (b) "ever sending him [Chase] any agreement"; or (c) "ever
discussing any contractual details that were held with IntegraCore." (R.1951)
45.

Spiers testified that he was open to negotiation with IntegraCore, indicating

that if there were "measurable new volumes and opportunities" for IntegraCore' s
shipping characteristics, he would "work to discuss and develop a strategy on pricing,"
particularly if it would help "chip away" at lntegraCore's "UPS volumes." (R.1952)
46.

iDrive never submitted an RFP on behalf of IntegraCore to Fed Ex.

(R.1952)
4 7.

Spiers testified that Chase never submitted any "documents that analyzed

the carrier relationship between IntegraCore and Fed Ex," or responded to Spiers'
overture that Fed Ex may grant further price concessions. (R.1952)
48.

Spiers testified he was "surprised that he did not hear any follow up from
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~

Mr. Chase," during the 2011 time period, or thereafter. (R.1952)
49.

There is no evidence that Haderlie, Broman or anyone else at IntegraCore

told Spiers not to work with Chase, or that Spiers would not have worked with Chase.
(R.1952-53)
50.

iDrive has not produced any documents or other evidence, including RFPs,

of optimization efforts concerning other Carriers, such as OHL, truck load or less than
truck load carriers. (R.1953)
51.

IntegraCore timely paid iDrive the retainer amount for pricing optimization

services of $2, 185/month. However, because iDrive did not perform the required pricing
optimization services, IntegraCore did not compensate iDrive under the 38% commission

Ci

provision of the Agreement (§3(a)(l)), for any savings realized under its new UPS
contracts. (R.195 5)

K

~

~

52.

In approximately May of 2011, IntegraCore began to use iDrive's USPS

account for some USPS shipments. iDrive functioned as a middleman or broker for
USPS, and would "run IntegraCore's volume through iDrive's USPS" account, together
with iDrive's other customers. (R.2925)
53.

There is no provision of the Agreement that requires IntegraCore to make

USPS shipments through iDrive's USPS account. Rather, "[f]inal selection of a
Carrier(s) is the CUSTOMER'S decision" under the Agreement. (R.1956; Agreement,
§l(a).)

Gt

54.

Broman expressly informed Chase, before IntegraCore started using
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iDrive's USPS account, that IntegraCore would use the USPS broker that provided the
fl)

best rate, and that it did not need iDrive's permission to switch. (R.4106)
55.

There is no separate compensation provision in the Agreement for USPS,

including that would entitle iDrive to earn profits on margin on any shipping IntegraCore
Qi

does through iDrive's USPS account. (R.1956; Agreement, §3.)
56.

iDrive does not claim that IntegraCore did not pay iDrive in full for every

shipment made through iDrive's USPS account. (R.4107)
i)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

A.
1.

The Pricing Optimization Services Issues

The trial court's interpretation of the Agreement: The primary issue in

this appeal is a simple one: was iDrive required to actually provide the agreed-upon
pricing optimization services to earn a right to commission compensation for providing
such services, and to maintain its claim for breach of contract? Perplexingly, the trial
court answered this question in the negative, concluding iDrive gets to "collect 3 8% of
savings from all contract improvements regardless of whether or not iDrive actually
et)

performed the optimization services." (Add. D, at 9.) This ruling was erroneous in
several respects.
First, it disregarded the parties' intentions by failing to give effect to all of the
provisions of the Agreement and the parties' own testimonies regarding the intent of the
Agreement. Specifically, the trial court's interpretation rendered at least the following
key provisions meaningless: (a) iDrive's "pricing optimization services" obligations
listed in Section l(a) of the Agreement; (b) iDrive's obligations as VP of Logistics for
19
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IntegraCore - an officer and fiduciary of IntegraCore -under Section l(a) and 2 of the
Agreement; and (c) the language of the compensation provision itself, Section 3(a)(l),
which specifically conditioned iDrive's right to payment to its fulfillment of these
obligations, stating: "(t]or providing the services set forth by this agreement, iDrive ...
shall receive thirty-eight percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from
iDRIVE'S optimization service." The trial court also refused to consider testimony from
the principals of both iDrive and IntegraCore that lntegraCore would only have to pay
iDrive if iDrive found or created savings under Carrier agreements for IntegraCore that it
otherwise would not have received. The trial court cannot adopt a construction that
ignores the expressed intent of the parties in both the Agreement and while under oath.
Second, the trial court's interpretation disregarded the legal requirement that a
party must prove performance of its own obligations under a contract to maintain a claim
for breach of contract, particularly where, as here, the Agreement expressly tied payment
to performance. (See Agreement,§ 3(a)(l).)
Third, the trial court's interpretation rendered iDrive's promises to provide
optimization services illusory. Not only did the court hold that iDrive had no obligation
to perform, but it also held that the one-sided exculpatory clause in Section 4 of the
Agreement precluded IntegraCore from bringing suit for breach of contract, giving iDrive
unfettered discretion to discontinue performance at any time without consequence.

2.

The trial court's finding of performance. Although concluding iDrive

did not need to perform, the trial court appeared to hedge by also finding, as a matter of
law, that iDrive had "performed or was in the process of performing as required" by the
20
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(I)

Agreement by October 2011. (Add. A, at 4; Add. B, at 2; Add. C, at 3; Add. D., at 7-8.)
The trial court erred in making these factual findings, on summary judgment, because
they were not supported by undisputed facts. The trial court ignored substantial evidence
of nonperformance by iDrive. Indeed, because it is undisputed iDrive never performed a
•

significant number of its optimization obligations - including by ceasing all optimization
efforts with UPS after May of2011 and failing to make any effort with respect to FedEx
and all other Carriers outside of UPS - it is actually IntegraCore that was entitled to
summary judgment on iDrive' s contract claims.
The trial court's observation that there is no "time is of the essence" clause in the
Agreement also does not justify its ruling. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, iDrive
accepted fiduciary obligations to IntegraCore by becoming both IntegraCore's VP of
Logistics and IntegraCore' s agent under the Agreement. iDrive' s fiduciary obligations
required it to use at least its "best efforts" to get IntegraCore savings with all Carriers, not
sit idle. Nor is the lack of an express "time is of the essence clause," or a demand for
performance, material where iDrive is required to prove its performance to earn
compensation and recover on its own claim for breach of contract.
The language of the Agreement and the undisputed facts establish the Agreement
was an "earn in" contract, whereby iDrive would receive commission compensation if it
created Carrier contract savings that IntegraCore would not have otherwise received. The
commission provision was never triggered because iDrive never created any Carrier
savings that IntegraCore would not have otherwise received.
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3.

The trial court's finding that IntegraCore materially breached the

Agreement. The trial court ruled IntegraCore materially breached the Agreement in
October of 2011 by: (1) "failing to apprise iDrive of negotiations with UPS"; (2)
"enter[ing] into a new carrier agreement with UPS without involvement from iDrive";
and (3) "not pay[ing] 38% of any savings to iDrive as a result of the new carrier
agreements" with UPS. (Add. D, at 6; Add. A, at 2-4; Add. B, at 2; Add. C, at 2-3.)
These rulings are erroneous, including because they: (I) ignore iDrive breached
the Agreement long before October of 2011 by failing to perform as required, including
by purporting to impermissibly delegate its obligations to negotiate with Carriers to
Hadlerie; (2) are not based on undisputed facts but impermissibly weigh evidence; (3)
misclassify iDrive' s obligations to work and negotiate directly with Carriers, which were
for the benefit of IntegraCore, as iDrive' s rights under the Agreement; and (4) disregard
evidence, including iDrive's own contentions in its Complaint, indicating iDrive waived
any rights it may have had to be involved in negotiations with Carriers.

B.

The USPS Issues.

iDrive' s claim regarding USPS has been a moving target. In its Complaint and
throughout discovery, iDrive claimed IntegraCore breached the Agreement when it began
making "USPS shipments using a non-iDrive account"; specifically, through a USPS
broker named Move Method. (R.14, 2238.) Then, when IntegraCore sought summary
judgment on this claim because it was unsupported by the Agreement, iDrive abruptly
shifted gears by claiming the parties orally modified the Agreement to require
IntegraCore to exclusively use iDrive's USPS account and to pay a penalty, "in the event
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IntegraCore switched to a non-iDrive USPS agreement," of "38% of the savings realized"
under the new USPS Agreement. (R.2640-41, 2685-87.)
Neither theory has merit as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying
IntegraCore's summary judgment motion on iDrive's USPS claim. iDrive's pleaded
•

USPS theory fails because (a) there is no provision of the Agreement requiring
IntegraCore to use, exclusively use, or continue to use iDrive's USPS account and (b)
iDrive's damage theory- based upon a calculation of the "profit margin" iDrive
purportedly should have made on IntegraCore's USPS shipments - seeks a measure of
compensation not recognized by the Agreement and is thus not cognizable.
iDrive's newly-minted oral modification theory fails because: (a) there is no
evidence the purported modification occurred, as recognized by the trial court's ruling
that "[n]either party has presented evidence of other terms or writings that should be
incorporated into the Agreement" (Add. D at 6); (b) it is not supported by the pleadings
or discovery, and parties cannot invent claims to avoid summary judgment; (c) it relies on
a damage theory that is inconsistent with the opinion asserted by iDrive's own damage
expert; (d) it is barred by the statute of frauds; and (e) it fails for lack of mutual assent.
Accordingly, the trial court's Summary Judgment Orders should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Misapplied the Rules of Contract Interpretation By
Interpreting the Agreement to Relieve iDrive of the Obligation to Perform.
A.

Legal Principles

1.

Elements of a claim for breach of contract.

To recover for breach of contract, iDrive must establish all of the following
elements: "(l) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of
contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design,I L.L.C.1 2001 UT
20, if14, 20 P.3d 388. At issue here are the second and third elements-performance and
breach. The starting place for evaluating these elements is the Agreement.

2.

Rules of contract interpretation.

"The primary purpose of contract interpretation is to 'ascertain the intentions of
the parties' at the time of contracting.'" Equine Assisted Growth & Learning Ass 'n v.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 2011 UT 49, ,Il3, 266 P.3d 733 (citation omitted). "To discover

these intentions, [Utah Courts] first examine the plain language of the contract." Id.
Utah Courts "consider each contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a
view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id. (ellipses in original) (quotations
and citation omitted); accord Gillmorv. Macyl 2005 UT App 351, ,I19, 121 P.3d 57
("' [I]t is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its
provisions and all of its terms ...." (citation omitted)).
If a court is unable to harmonize all of a contract's provisions, the contract may be
ambiguous. A term is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies."' Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ~25, 190 P.3d 1269 (citation omitted);
"[C]ontractual ambiguity can occur in two different contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with
regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the
•

contracting parties." Id. "[I]f the judge determines that the contract is facially ambiguous,
'parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted."' Id. (citations omitted).
There is a two-part test to determine facial ambiguity:
First, we indicated that "[ w]hen determining whether a contract is
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise,
the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is
based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic
education and experience.' " Second, after a judge considers relevant
and credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must
ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably
supported by the language of the contract."
Id. at ~26 (citations omitted). If both interpretations are reasonably supported, the
contract is facially ambiguous, and parol evidence of intent must be admitted. Id. at
~~26-27, 31.

B.

The Scope of iDrive's Duties for Pricing Optimization Services.

1.

iDrive's contractual obligations for pricing optimization services.

The parties agreed iDrive would provide IntegraCore with ''services to reduce
•

transportation expenses," including the following "pricing optimization service[s]":
collecting and analyzing CUSTOMER's current parcel shipping
data, pricing and Carrier contracts; establishing negotiation
parameters with the CUSTOMER; issuing Request for Proposals
(RFP) to the Carriers; collecting and analyzing the Carriers'
responses to the RFP; negotiating pricing, terms and conditions with
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the Carriers; presenting analysis on Carrier proposals to the
CUSTOMER. Final selection of a Carrier(s) is the CUSTOMER's
decision.
(Agreement, §§ 1, 1(a).) Additionally, as "VP of Logistics" for IntegraCore, iDrive
(through Chase) was also required to "[s]pend 2 days in IntegraCore's operations learning
current logistic practices and operations"; to "[c]onduct 2 additional visits over the next 2
quarters"; and to "work directly with carriers regarding carrier agreements, services and
strategic changes." (Id., §2.)
iDrive' s right to receive compensation for pricing optimization services is
expressly tied to its fulfillment of these obligations. Section 3(a)(l) states: "For
providing the services set forth by this agreement, iDrive ... shall receive thirty-eight
percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from iDRIVE'S optimization
service." (Agreement, §3(a)(l) (emphasis added).)

2.

iDrive also owed fiduciary obligations to lntegraCore.

By agreeing to serve as both the VP of Logistics (an officer) oflntegraCore
(Agreement, §§l{a) and 2), and as an "agent" oflntegraCore (id., §7(b)), Chase and
iDrive incurred fiduciary obligations to lntegraCore under Utah law. C&Y Corp. v.

General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding officers are
fiduciaries); Eager v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, if25, 191 P.3d 9 (agents are fiduciaries).
Fiduciaries "'are obliged to use their ingenuity, influence, and energy, and to
employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the property and
earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are in conflict
with their own personal interests."' C&Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54 (citation omitted); Eager,
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2008 UT 42 at if25 ('"[T]he general fiduciary principle requires that the agent subordinate
the agent's interests to those of the principal and place the principal's interests first as to
matters connected with the agency relationship."' (citation omitted)).
As noted by two well-regarded commentators:
The fiduciary relationship exposes a beneficiary/principal to two
distinct types of wrongdoing: first, the fiduciary may misappropriate
the principal's asset or some of its value (an act of malfeasance); and
second, the fiduciary may neglect the asset's management (an act of
nonfeasance). Each type of wrongdoing is controlled by imposing a
legal duty upon the fiduciary.
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic

Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1991). Several
authorities have thus held an agent is required to at least use its "best efforts" to promote
the principal's interests. See, e.g., Christalina S.A. v. Christie, Manson, Woods Intern.,

Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 292-94, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1 st Dep't 1986); St. James Armenian
Church ofLos Angeles v. Kurkjian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 547,554 (Ct. App. 1975).

C.

The Trial Court Misapplied the Rules of Contract Interpretation in
Relieving iDrive of Any Obligation to Perform.

In the Summary Judgment Orders, the trial court held the Agreement
"unambiguously requires [IntegraCore] to pay [iDrive] for 38% of savings achieved with
any new carrier agreement entered into during the term of the 2011 agreement, regardless
of whether [iDrive] participates in the negotiation of such new agreement." (Add. A, at
3.) The trial court went even further in the Clarification Order:
The Agreement clause in question reads, "iDRIVE shall receive
thirty-eight percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives
from iDRIVE's optimization service." The Court construes the term
27
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"derives" according to its ordinary, natural and plain meaning. The
definition of derive is "to take, receive, or obtain especially from a
specified source." Since all agreements entered into by IntegraCore
are deemed to be the work of iDrive, the Court reads the Agreement
as allowing iDrive to collect 38% of savings from all contract
improvements regardless of whether or not iDrive actually
performed the optimization seivices.
(Add. D, at 9-10 (fn. omitted) (emphasis added).) The trial court also concluded:
IntegraCore argues that iDrive is not entitled to any payment for an
agreement they were not involved in negotiating. While section
(3)(a) of the Agreement states that iDrive will be paid "[f]or
providing the services set forth in this agreement," it also states in
section (3)(a)(l) that "all improvements made to any of
CUSTOMERS [sic] contracts ... are considered to be the result of
iDrive' s optimization efforts." Harmonizing these two contract
clauses, the Court finds that the improvement to IntegraCore' s
contract with UPS was the work of iDrive and therefore IntegraCore
must compensate iDrive for the savings resulting from that
improvement. This interpretation incorporates all of the relevant
terms of the Agreement into a cohesive understanding of
IntegraCore's obligations.
(Add. D, at 5.) IntegraCore respectfully submits the trial court erred in its analysis in
several respects.
1.

The trial court erred by failing to interpret the Agreement in
accordance with all terms and evidence of the parties' intent

IntegraCore interprets the Agreement to require iDrive to perform its obligations
to provide optimization services to earn a right to receive payment of 38% of the savings
IntegraCore derived from those optimization seivices. Notably, only IntegraCore's
interpretation reflects the intent of the parties, as established by all available evidence.
Specifically, only IntegraCore's interpretation is supported by both the plain language of
the Agreement itself, (Agreement, §§(l)(a), 2, 3(a)(l)), and the testimonies of the
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principals of IntegraCore and iDrive that the Agreement required iDrive to provide
"value" or savings IntegraCore "otherwise would not have obtained but for iDrive' s
involvement." (Facts 10-12.) As Chase stated:
That's why our customers signed us on. Our commitment is: We
will find savings for you. Even ifwe don't-if we don't, you don't
pay us anything ....
(Fact 12.) This construction of the Agreement makes logical sense because no reasonable
person would expect to pay iDrive millions of dollars "regardless of whether or not
iDrive actually performed the optimization services" it was hired to provide, as the trial
court held. (Add. D, at 9.) Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ,r19, 994 P.2d 193 (courts
"interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties,
looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the
contract.").
However, the trial court rejected IntegraCore's interpretation, and refused to
consider the parties' testimonies, in favor of the interpretation iDrive adopted for
litigation-that it gets paid regardless of whether it actually performs. (Add. D, at 7, 910.) This interpretation is error because it fails to give effect to the intent of the parties,
including as reflected all of the provisions of the contract. Equine, 2011 UT 49 at 113.
The trial court's interpretation results in the terms "derives" and "[f]or providing
the services set forth in this agreement," (Agreement, §3(a)(l)), and iDrive's obligation
"to provide [IntegraCore] with services to reduce transportation expenses," (id., § 1),
being overwritten by the other terms, and rendered meaningless. This is made clear by
the ruling that iDrive gets to "collect 38% of savings from all contract improvements
29
(j)
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regardless of whether or not iDrive actually performed the optimization services." (Add.
D, at 9.) Equally important, the trial court's construction rendered the specific recitation
of iDrive's pricing optimization duties in Section l(a) and its obligations as VP of
Logistics for IntegraCore in Section 2 meaningless. The trial court thus interpreted the
Agreement to impose obligations only one way - upon IntegraCore - and, indeed, the
trial court made clear its interpretation only provided a "cohesive understanding of

IntegraCore 's obligations." (Id., at 5 (emphasis added).) Such a construction is not
possible if all the terms are given effect because it does not account for iDrive 's
obligations.
The trial court's interpretation, in addition, conflated the term "improvements"
with "savings," as if both mean the same thing under this Agreement. That is not the
case. Whereas "improvement" was used passively in the Agreement as an adjective to
describe a change in IntegraCore's Carrier contracts, the term "savings" was an active
term invariably linked to services iDrive was required to provide. 3 As indicated, Chase
described "savings" as something iDrive was going to "find" for IntegraCore. It was thus
error for the trial court to construe "savings" as something IntegraCore would have
received without iDrive's involvement because it reads the term out of context and
ignored its intended meaning to the parties. Just because IntegraCore acquires a new
Carrier agreement, does not mean iDrive "saved" IntegraCore money.
3

(See, e.g., Agreement, §3(a)(l)-iDrive shall receive ... 38% of savings that
[IntegraCore] derives from iDrive's optimization service."; and "[f]or the purposes of
calculating savings from iDrive's optimization efforts with Carriers ...."; and
CUSTOMER's benchmark data will be used as the basis for calculating savings
attributable to iDrive's Pricing Optimization Services." (emphasis added).)
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It was also error for the trial court to refuse consider the parties' testimonies in
interpreting the Agreement. See Daines, 2008 UT 51 at ,I27 (observing "'[r]ational
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence."'
(citation omitted)). Had the trial court correctly considered all relevant terms and
Qi)

evidence as required, it could not have adopted iDrive's interpretation because it is
plainly contrary to the parties' intent. Id. at ,r,r26, 31. Simply put, where all of the
evidence universally supported IntegraCore's interpretation, and where IntegraCore's
interpretation was reasonably supported by the language of the contract, it was actually
IntegraCore, rather than iDrive, that was entitled to have its interpretation adopted. Id.

2.

The trial court erroneously relieved iDrive ofits obligation to
perform.

The trial court's interpretation also disregarded the legal requirement that a party
"must take care to discharge his own duties under the contract" to maintain a claim for
breach of contract. Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974); Bair, 2001 UT
20 at ,Il4. This is particularly true where the Agreement expressly required completion
of specific obligations before payment, and where iDrive (through Chase) owed fiduciary
duties to IntegraCore as both IntegraCore's VP of Logistics and IntegraCore's agent.
(See id., §§ l(a), 2 and 7(b)).
(j)

The Utah Supreme Court has long rejected the position iDrive took, and the court
adopted, in an analogous real-estate broker context, by holding "[t]o entitle a broker to
the payment of his commissions, it is essential that he prove ... the actual rendition of all

~

of the services called for by his contract of employment." Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222,
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207 P. 153, 155 (1922). Other jurisdictions have similarly held:
The listing agreement provided that the commission would be due whether
the property was sold by Bowman Real Estate, another broker, or by the
Krugers themselves. This type of provision, however, has not been
interpreted to entitle the broker to a commission under all circumstances.
Rather, there must be some proof of consideration for the contract by
performance of services by the real estate agent. The broker must show
substantial performance of the duties imposed on him by the contract, even
ifhe does not produce a buyer to be eligible for a commission. To recover a
commission even under an exclusive right-to-sell provision, clear evidence
of expenditure of time, effort, or money by the broker must be presented.
Where such a showing is absent the listing agreement has the
characteristics of a unilateral contract, which is not binding for lack of
sufficient consideration ....
Kruger v. Soreide, 246 N.W.2d 764, 773 (N.D. 1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis

added); see also Kahler, Inc. v. Weiss, 539 N.W. 86, 91 (S.D. 1995) (adopting Kruger
and observing, "a broker's promise to use 'best efforts' or 'diligent efforts' to find a
purchaser is implied, for if it were not, then the broker could sit idly by and do nothing,
or almost nothing, and yet be entitled to a commission derived from the seller's own
efforts to secure a purchaser."). 4 This Court should reverse the erroneous holding that

4

Accord Merten v. Vogt, 208 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Ky. 1948) (holding broker could not
recover, on the following facts: "Certainly it could not be persuasively argued that the
[broker] could enter into the contract as stated above and then sit guietly by for an
indefinite period of time, do nothing about the sale of the property. and then expect to
enforce his contract. True, he contacted Dr. Crawford; showed him the property in March
or April of 1943; was unable to consummate the sale, and in July of that year wrote him a
letter inquiring why he had quit on the Thierman Apartments, and in the same letter
inquired if Dr. Crawford would be interested in other apartments that Merten had. After
July 6, 1943, the date the letter was addressed, nothing was done in an effort to sell the
property to Dr. Crawford, or to anyone else." (emphasis added)); cf 15 Willison on
Contracts§ 44:52 (4th ed. 2014) ("(W]hen the parties have entered into a bilateral
contract calling for an exchange of performances, and one of the parties must perform
first; that party's substantial performance is a constructive condition precedent to the
other's duty to render the return performance promised." (emphasis added)).
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~

IntegraCore must pay iDrive a commission for doing nothing.

3.

The trial court's interpretation would render the optimization
provisions illusory.

An interpretation that relieves iDrive of any obligation to perform would also
render the pricing optimization provisions illusory. See Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston
(j

Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985) ("An illusory promise neither
binds the person making it, nor functions as consideration for a return promise."). Such a
@

conclusion is made even more compelling by the trial court's holding that the one-sided
exculpatory clause in Section 4 of the Agreement barred IntegraCore's contract claims.
(Add. B, at 2.) If iDrive did not need to provide the agreed-upon optimization services,
and IntegraCore lacks any legal recourse for iDrive's failure to perform, then iDrive "has
an unlimited right to decide the nature or extent of [its] performance," which renders its
"promise" both "illusory and too indefinite for legal enforcement." See id. at 1037;
accord Innovate Tech. Solutions v. Youngsoft, Inc., 418 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Tex. Ct. App.
2013) (observing, "ifYoungsoft is completely insulated from any damage claims from
Innovate, it effectively retains the option of discontinuing performance at any time,"
which makes the contract "illusory, void, and unenforceable."). 5

5

See also Infowise Solutions, Inc. v. Microstrategy, Inc., 2005 WL 2445436 *5 (N.D.
Tex., September 29, 2005) (unpublished) (same); Padberg v. DISH Network, LLC, 2012
WL 2120765 *4 (W.D. Missouri, June 11, 2012) (unpublished) (same).
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II.

The Trial Court Erred by Finding, as Matter of Law, that iDrive Performed
its Pricing Optimization Obligations Under the Agreement.
(&j)

A.
The Trial Court Finding that iDrive's Performed Was Not Based on
Undisputed Evidence.
It is impossible to tell what effect the trial court's erroneous interpretation of the
Agreement had on the remainder of its rulings. However, in addition to holding iDrive
had no obligation to provide the agreed-upon pricing optimization services, the trial court
also found, as a matter of law, that iDrive had "performed or was in the process of
performing, as required by the terms of the 2011 Agreement," as of October 2011. (Add.
A, at 4; Add. B, at 2; Add. C, at 3; Add. D. at 7-8.) In response to IntegraCore's request
for clarification of this vague ruling, the trial court stated:
Specifically, iDrive fulfilled its obligations by assisting iDrive [sic]
in hiring Thad Haderlie, collecting and analyzing IntegraCore's
carrier agreements, providing negotiation strategies, performing
account auditing, and otherwise managing the carrier accounts.
(Add. D, at 6 (emphasis added).)
The trial court erred in making these factual findings, on summary judgment,
because they were not supported by undisputed facts. See, e.g., Martin v. Lauder, 2010
UT App 216, ,I14, 239 P.3d 519 ("On summary judgment, '[t]he trial court must not
weigh evidence or assess credibility,' and where 'there are other equally plausible
inferences to be drawn from the evidence ... summary judgment should not have been
granted."') (citations omitted)).
The trial court's finding that iDrive "performed" or was in "the process of
performing" is directly contradicted by its own observation that "it is undisputed that
34
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4i

iDrive did not perform any negotiation services related to the UPS agreement executed
October 2011." (Add. D, p. 3 (emphasis added)). The trial court also overlooked at least
the following undisputed evidence:
•

Neither Chase, nor anyone else from iDrive, fulfilled the obligations under §2
to "conduct two additional visits [to IntegraCore] over the next two quarters"
after the Agreement was signed. (Fact 18.)

•

iDrive did not issue any RFPs to any Carriers, including UPS, as required by
§l(a), ever. (Facts 23, 46, 50.)

•

Because iDrive did not issue any RFPs, it did never "collect[ed] and analyz[ed]
the Carriers' responses to the RFP," as required by § 1(a).

•

iDrive did not "work directly" with Carriers regarding changes to
IntegraCore's Carrier agreements or "negotiat[e] pricing, terms and conditions
with the Carriers," as required by § I (a) and §2. Rather, it is undisputed that:
o iDrive's last communication with UPS regarding IntegraCore was in
late May 2011. (Facts 25-28.)
o Trujillo testified that she never negotiated with anyone for a new UPS
contract for IntegraCore, and that iDrive played no role in the decision
to provide a new contract to IntegraCore in October 2011. (Facts 37,
39-40.)
o iDrive did not negotiate with FedEx for a new contract for IntegraCore;
did not submit any documents to FedEx that analyzed the relationship
between IntegraCore and FedEx; never called Spiers; and ceased all
communications with FedEx in early spring of 2011. (Facts 44-49.)
o iDrive did not attempt to negotiate a new contract for IntegraCore with
any other Carriers, such as DHL, truck load, or less than truck load
carriers. (Fact 50.)
o iDrive claims it attempted to unilaterally delegate iDrive's and Chase's
obligations to work and negotiate directly with Carriers to Haderlie,
even though (a) the Agreement precluded oral modifications and
required Chase (as IntegraCore's VP of Logistics) to report to Broman;
(b) there is no evidence Broman approved delegation to Haderlie; and
(c) Rothwell testified Haderlie was not qualified to negotiate and
optimize Carrier contracts. (Facts 30-34.)

35
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Both Trujillo and Speirs testified IntegraCore did not tell them not to work
with Chase, and there is no evidence Trujillo and Speirs refused to work with
Chase if Chase had tried. (Facts 29, 45-49.)

•

iDrive's expert, Gooding, testified he was not aware of anything preventing
Chase or iDrive from trying to get a better contract for lntegraCore. (Fact 42.)

•

Gooding opined that IntegraCore would have received a better contract from
UPS in October of 2011 had it "attempted to negotiate." (Fact 41.)

These undisputed facts constitute substantial evidence that iDrive neither
performed, nor was in the process of performing, its pricing optimization services. As
indicated above, iDrive has a duty to at least substantially perform its pricing
optimization obligations. "A party has substantially performed when 'the only variance
from the strict and literal performance consists of technical or unimportant omissions or
defects."' Reliance Ins. Co v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted) (abrogated on other grounds). None of these unperformed duties
could be described as "technical or unimportant," and certainly not as a matter of law, as

~

the trial court implicitly concluded. 6
6

Take, for example, iDrive's failure to issue RFPs to Carriers. A California federal court
recently described how the RFP process was supposed to work in the "parcel contract
optimization services" context:
In conjunction with the shipper, AFMS [third party optimization
consultant] may create an RFP, inviting the carriers to bid on the
shipper's business. The RFP package includes the target incentives
sought via the RFP process, which a carrier should meet to stay
competitive in the process. AFMS sets a timeline for the carrier's
bids and the negotiation process. AFMS and/or the shipper may meet
with the carrier to present the RFP and negotiate discounts and rates.
The carriers then submit bids for the customer's shipping business.
AFMS, LLC v. United Parcel Srvc. Co., 105 F.Supp.3d 1061, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
This description highlights how beneficial the RFP process would have been to
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Moreover, there is no link between the five items the trial court relied upon to
conclude iDrive "fulfilled its obligations" and any reduction in IntegraCore's Carrier
costs, as would be necessary for IntegraCore to "derive[]" savings from iDrive' s
optimization services. (See Agreement, §3(a)(l).) The "account auditing" function, for
example, has nothing to do with the question at bar - whether iDrive fulfilled its pricing
optimization services under the Agreement. The two types of services are, in fact, treated
separately in nearly all respects and are divisible from each other. See, e.g., In re
Payless, 203 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8 th Cir. 2000) ("A divisible contract is 'in legal effect,
independent agreements about different subjects though made at the same time."').
The audit services are not listed among the pricing optimization services in
Section l(a), but rather are separately defined in Section l(b). Audit services and
optimization services also have separate compensation provisions, (compare Agreement,
•

§3(a) with §3(b)), and unique "agreement term[s]." (Id. p. 2). See Payless, 203 F.3d at
1085 (finding a contract was divisible where it had separately defined services, "clearly
delineated sections" and the "[c]onsideration is apportioned"); Estate Landscape & Snow
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322,328, n. 3
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (observing contracts providing for "multiple services" are generally
divisible, and gathering cases supporting observation). 7

Cj)

IntegraCore, as it invites Carriers to compete for IntegraCore's business. Of course, for
the process to work as intended, iDrive would have had to actually prepare and issue an
RFP to multiple Carriers-something it is undisputed iDrive never did.
7
IntegraCore also takes issue with the other items of performance the trial court
identified. For example, it is not an undisputed fact that Rothwell's forwarding of a
resume for Haderlie fulfilled iDrive's obligations to help find, interview and recruit a
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B.

iDrive's Nonperformance Entitled lntegraCore to Summary Judgment
on iDrive's Contract Claim.

The facts outlined above detailing iDrive's failure to fulfill its pricing optimization
obligations under the Agreement are undisputed. Simply stated, it is undisputed iDrive
did not contact a single Carrier, or perform any other pricing optimization services as
required, after May of 2011. This far precedes the first alleged breach by IntegraCore in
October of 2011. There is also no evidence IntegraCore interfered with iDrive's ability
to complete its duties - as acknowledged by iDrive's own expert. (Fact 42.) Nor is there
any evidence IntegraCore "derive[ d]" any savings from iDrive's services or that iDrive
did anything else that led to a reduction in IntegraCore's Carrier costs.
Under these facts, IntegraCore was entitled to summary judgment in its favor
dismissing iDrive' s claim for breach of contract because there is no basis in the record
upon which it could reasonably be concluded that iDrive fulfilled its pricing optimization
obligations, particularly as a fiduciary, to establish the required element of performance
and earn compensation under the Agreement. 8 Although iDrive's failure to perform its

"Director of Logistics" for IntegraCore, particularly where Haderlie is not IntegraCore's
Director of Logistics. (Fact 14.) Similarly, the vague finding that iDrive performed by
"otherwise managing the carrier accounts" is disputed and immaterial, given that iDrive
was actually obligated to "manage the contract negotiation/optimization process" not
"carrier accounts."
8
See Fischer, 525 P.2d at 46-47 (entering judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' contract
claim where "there is no basis in the evidence to justify a conclusion that the plaintiffs
sufficiently performed, or tendered performance, of their own obligations," despite
evidence that plaintiffs served a letter saying they were "ready and willing" to perform,
and that defendants left town to avoid the closing); Kruger, 246 N.W.2d at 773 ("At best,
the record reveals a perfunctory effort by [the brokers] to sell the property" and thus "the
record reflects an absence of substantial performance by the realtors ... and, therefore,
they are not entitled to recover the commission."); Merten,208 S.W.2d at 740-41 (fn. 4,).
38
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"

'»

obligations is also a breach of contract, as discussed in Section III, it is not necessary for

fl

IntegraCore to prove its own claim for breach of contract in order to receive summary
judgment in its favor on iDrive 's claim.

C.

iDrive's Legal Defenses to Nonperformance Fail.

1.

iDrive's Duty to Perform is Not Excused by the Lack of an Express
"Time is of the Essence" Clause in the Agreement.

The trial court also excused iDrive' s nonperformance on the basis that "time was
not of the essence in this contract for illrive to perform its pricing optimization
obligations other than to conduct two additional visits in the next two quarters." {Add D,
at 5, 8.) This conclusion is erroneous in several respects.
First, the lack of an express "time is of the essence" clause does not give a party
unlimited time to perform. In general, "when a provision in a contract requires an act to
be performed without specifying the time, the law implies that it is to be done within a
reasonable time under the circumstances." Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240,
1242 (Utah 1980); Fischer, 525 P.2d at 46. Here, moreover, iDrive's obligations are
~

heightened significantly because iDrive did not merely have the duties of an ordinary
contracting party. Rather, Chase and iDrive owed fiduciary duties to IntegraCore.
As indicated above, as fiduciaries iDrive and Chase were required to put
IntegraCore' s interests first and to use their "best efforts" to accomplish their tasks.
These obligations precluded them from simply doing nothing and waiting to see if
IntegraCore acquired a new Carrier contract in some other way during the term of the
Agreement. Every day they sat idle cost IntegraCore money in the form of unrealized
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

savings. Nevertheless, it is undisputed this is precisely what iDrive did; making no effort
to contact a single Carrier after May of 2011, despite iDrive's claim that it did not know

(I

IntegraCore received a new agreement from UPS until late 2012. 9 (R.2657)
However, the trial court concluded, without analysis, that iDrive was not an agent
of IntegraCore and that Chase and iDrive owed no fiduciary duties to IntegraCore
because iDrive's duties to IntegraCore "are limited to those enumerated in the
Agreement." (Add. D, at 10.) This is error. The trial court cited no authority supporting
the conclusion that corporate officers and agents do not owe fiduciary duties to the
principal. As indicated above, the law is to the contrary. Moreover, the trial court's
ruling that iDrive was not IntegraCore's "agent," is contrary to §7(b) of the Agreement.
The trial court thus erred in relieving iDrive and Chase of their fiduciary obligations and
by applying "time is of the essence" principles to relieve iDrive of its obligation to
perform.
Second, the Agreement expressly required iDrive to perform "the services set forth
in this [A]greement," before IntegraCore was required to compensate iDrive for those
services. (Agreement, §3(a){l).) This being the case, it did not matter whether there was a
clause expressly making "time of the essence" because IntegraCore's duty to pay iDrive
for pricing optimization services did not arise until iDrive earned its pay by performing or
tendering performance of its obligations under the Agreement.

9

Given this, it is not necessary to guess what iDrive may have done in the absence of
the October 2011 UPS Agreement. iDrive cannot claim that if it were given more time, or
but-for the October 2011 UPS Agreement, it would have performed because it is known
that iDrive did in fact continue to do nothing.
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2.

IntegraCore was not required to give notice of nonperformance.

The trial court also adopted iDrive's argument that lntegraCore was required to
provide notice to iDrive that its performance was untimely. (Add. A, at 4; Add D., at 56.) Neither this principle, nor the authorities upon which it is based, 10 are applicable

t>

under the facts of this case for at least three primary reasons: (a) iDrive's cases do not
concern a services contract involving a fiduciary relationship, which precluded iDrive
from neglecting its duties and rendered any demand to perform unnecessary; (b) the
plaintiffs in iDrive's authorities performed or tendered their performance, unlike here;
and (c) none of the cited authorities supports the argument that IntegraCore was obligated
to demand performance by iDrive before IntegraCore had the right to refuse to pay iDrive
for unperformed services under this Agreement or to defend itself against iDrive' s claims
in this case. The Fischer case, and the other authorities cited by IntegraCore, detailing

ii)

iDrive's burden to prove its own performance, are much more on-point.

III.

The Trial Court Erred by Determining IntegraCore Materially Breached the
Agreement and Waived the Defense of Nonperformance.
A.

IntegraCore Did Not Materially Breach the Agreement.

A material breach is "'a failure of performance which defeats the very object of
the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made
if default in that particular had been contemplated .... "' Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App

10

(See Add A. at 4-citing Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 P. 958 (Utah 1900);
Whitney v. Perry, 208 A.D. 2d 1025, 1026 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); and Boswell v. United
States, 123 F.2d213,215 (5 th Cir. 1941). Gammon-theonlyUtahcase-isofdubious
value as it deals with delivery of a deed to escrow, and provides no discussion of the rote
statement of law for which it has been cited. See Gammon, 64 P. at 959.
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135, ,I,r27-28, 303 P.3d 269 (citation omitted). "Whether a breach of contract constitutes
a material breach ... will ordinarily be resolved by the fact finder, and '[s]ummary

IS

judgment should be granted with great caution.'" Id. at ,I29(citation omitted).
The trial court ruled IntegraCore materially breached the Agreement in October of
2011 in three ways: (I) "by failing to apprise iDrive of negotiations with UPS"; (2) by
"enter[ing] into a new carrier agreement with UPS without involvement from iDrive";
and (3) by "not pay[ing] 38% of any savings to iDrive as a result of the new carrier
agreements" with UPS. (Add. D, at 6; Add. A, at 2-4; Add. B, at 2; Add. C, at 2-3.)
These determinations are erroneous for at least five reasons.
First, the trial court's determination that IntegraCore engaged in "negotiations"
with UPS is not supported by the facts. Trujillo testified there was no negotiation. (Fact
40.) iDrive's expert witness, Gooding, also opined that IntegraCore could have obtained
greater savings from UPS "had IntegraCore attempted to negotiate the terms of the
October 2011 proposal from UPS." (Fact 41.) There is no evidence at all negotiations
occurred. Thus, the trial court could only have made this finding by determining Trujillo
was not credible, which is not permissible on summary judgment. Martin, 2010 UT App
216 at ,rI4.
Second, iDrive claimed in its Complaint that it "deferred its right to control
information regarding IntegraCore' s logistics," and decided "to forego its right to
negotiate with Carriers on IntegraCore's behalf." (R.19-20) To the extent these were
actually iDrive' s "rights" under the Agreement, this is an admission iDrive waived the
very contractual rights upon which the trial court's first two findings of breach are
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predicated. However, these are not iDrive' s "rights," but its obligations; this is, in fact,
an admission iDrive did not perform as required by the Agreement.
Third, the trial court's finding that IntegraCore breached the Agreement by not
involving iDrive prior to entering into the agreements with UPS also impennissibly
fi;

weighs evidence and fails to draw all inferences in favor oflntegraCore. For example,
the trial court ignored the evidence detailed above indicating iDrive forever stopped
performing the required optimization services by May of 2011. (Facts 23, 25-28, 46, 50.)

(i)

iDrive has attempted to explain its failure to negotiate by claiming it orally
delegated its pricing optimization obligations back onto IntegraCore (to Haderlie). (Fact
30.) Not only is this disputed, but iDrive also presented no evidence Haderlie was
authorized by IntegraCore to modify the Agreement to relieve Chase or iDrive of their
obligations to work directly with Carriers. 11 Rather, Chase was required to report directly
i}

to Broman. (Agreement,§ l{a)). The Agreement also expressly precluded oral
modifications, (Id., §7(d)), and was subject to the statute of frauds because it had a three
year term. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(a). Moreover, Rothwell testified he believed

~

Haderlie was not qualified to negotiate with Carriers. (Fact 31.) Thus, while the
"delegation" to Haderlie is disputed, the effort to delegate would constitute material
breach or a repudiation/abandonment of performance by iDrive of at least its duties to
directly work with and negotiate with Carriers, and its duty to effectively "manage" the
contract negotiation/optimization process for IntegraCore. At the very least, these facts
11

George B. Leavitt Co. v. Couturier, 82 Utah 256, 23 P.2d 1101 (1933) (observing that
"there is no presumption ... that the agent has authority to rescind or modify the
contract ....").
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create a reasonable inference that iDrive's non-involvement was its own doing, which
precludes summary judgment for iDrive.
Fourth, with respect to all three purported breaches, the trial court disregarded
evidence that iDrive materially breached the Agreement before October of 201 I,
including by: (a) Chase's breach of §2 by failing to make the required visits to
IntegraCore (Fact 18); and (b) iDrive's breach of its fiduciary and contractual obligations
under§§ l(a) and 2, including by its unjustified failure to perform and purported
delegation of the responsibility to negotiate to Haderlie (Facts 22-34, 39, 42, 44-50).
Co babe v. Stanger, 844 P .2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992) ("A party's refusal to perform under
the terms of the agreement constitutes a breach of that agreement."). These prior breaches
excused IntegraCore's obligations to render its return performance, including to pay
iDrive for optimization services. Cross, 2013 UT App 135 at ,I25.
Finally. the trial court also erred in concluding as a matter of law that
IntegraCore's purported breaches were material. Id., at ,I29. It is difficult to understand
how not notifying iDrive of a new contract offer from UPS could be material where
IntegraCore had the exclusive right under the Agreement to decide whether or not to
enter into any new Carrier contracts. (Agreement,§ l(a)-"Final selection of a Carrier(s)
is the CUSTOMER's decision.") Where iDrive had no say in the decision itself, its
review of the terms of a proposal is ultimately immaterial. Moreover, iDrive's obligation
to provide optimization services is for the benefit of IntegraCore, not a right of iDrive,
and cannot support a finding of material breach by IntegraCore. Cf Kelley v. Leucadia
Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Utah 1992) ("A seller is not entitled to take advantage
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of a provision intended to benefit the buyer alone.").
B.

IntegraCore Did Not Waive the Defense of Nonperformance.

The trial court also ruled lntegraCore "waived" the defense of nonperformance,
and any claim for breach of contract by iDrive prior to October of 2011, by "continu[ing]
(I)

to accept Plaintiffs [iDrive's] performance under the 2011 Agreement, long after
Defendant [IntegraCore] now asserts it had a known excuse for nonperformance." (Add.
A, at 5-6 (emphasis added); see also Add. D, at 10-11.)
The trial court's waiver analysis fails. Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment
of a known right." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40
(Utah 1993). "Waiver is an intensely fact dependent question." McCleve Prop., LLC v.
D. Ray Hult Family Ltd. P'ship, 2013 UT App 185, ~9, 307 P.3d 650. Thus, as here,
summary judgment is generally inappropriate. Id.
As support for its waiver ruling, the trial court stated "[a]fter October, 2011,
IntegraCore continued to use iDrive's shipping account, receive iDrive's auditing
services, and communicated through various emails and phone calls that the Agreement
was still in effect." (Add D, at 10-11.) None of these purported acts are pricing
optimization services under the Agreement.
As indicated above, the "auditing services" are not at issue and are divisible from
the pricing optimization services. IntegraCore believes that "shipping services" refers to
USPS; but as detailed below, no provision of the Agreement required IntegraCore to use
iDrive's USPS account. IntegraCore is aware of no email or phone call in the record

Ci

after May of 2011 relating to iDrive's performance of its optimization services. The trial
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court thus erred in its waiver analysis where it was unable to cite any evidence iDrive
even performed any optimization services in support of its analysis.
The trial court's waiver analysis also fails on the independent ground that it
misapplies the underlying legal doctrine at issue, which states:
"When the promisor on a contract not already fully performed on
either side continues his performance in spite of a known excuse for
nonperformance, he loses his defense nonperformance."
(Add. A, at 5-quoting HB Zachry Co. v. The Traveler's Indemnity Co., 391 F.2d 43, 48
(5 th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).) The principle HB Zachry is trying to promote is the
waiver of the right to rescind where a nonbreaching party elects to continue performance.

See id. In its application of the rule, however, the trial court erred by citing only
purported acts of continued performance of non-optimization services by iDrive, not
IntegraCore. (See Add. A, at 5-6; Add. D, at 10-11.)
Finally, even if this rule were applicable as a defense to lntegraCore 's claim for
breach, the rule would not excuse iDrive's duty to prove it performed its pricing
optimization obligations prior to October 2011 to maintain its own claim to recover the
38% commission under the Section 3(a)(l) of the Agreement, for reasons stated above.

VI.

The Trial Court Erred by Denying Summary Judgment for IntegraCore on
iDrive' s Claim Regarding USPS.
A.

iDrive's pleaded claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law.

iDrive claimed IntegraCore breached the Agreement in June of2012 when it
began making "USPS shipments using a non-iDrive account"; specifically, through a
USPS broker named Move Method. (R.9-10, 2238) iDrive argued it was injured by the
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switch because, "[o]n IntegraCore's USPS shipments, iDrive earns a margin on every
shipping dollar IntegraCore spends using iDrive's USPS account." (R.2238) iDrive's
expert, Hoffman, clarified, "[t]here is no 38% commission on savings for IntegraCore's
USPS shipments." (R.2238) Hoffman thus determined iDrive's "lost profit damages" for
i>

USPS by "calculat[ing] the margin iDrive should have made on the IntegraCore's USPS
shipments made using Move Method's USPS account" at $942,872. (R.2240.)
IntegraCore is entitled to summary judgment on iDrive's USPS claim, as pied, on
because it is not supported by the terms of the Agreement. There is no provision of the
Agreement that requires IntegraCore to use iDrive' s USPS account in any fashion, let
alone exclusively or for any set period of time. (See Agreement.) Although IntegraCore
used iDrive's USPS account for some USPS shipments-for which IntegraCore paid
iDri ve in full-this does not establish IntegraCore was required to do so by the

•

Agreement. To the contrary, USPS is defined in the Agreement as a "Carrier." (Id., p.
1.) "Final selection of a Carrier(s) is the CUSTOMER'S Decision." (Id., § l(a).)
iDrive's "profit-margin" theory is also not supported. The only compensation
provision in the Agreement is in Section 3, which does not authorize iDrive to earn a
"margin on every shipping dollar" IntegraCore spends on USPS. (Agreement, §3.)
Rather, to recover lost revenue for USPS, as with other Carriers, iDrive would be limited
to 38% of "savings" IntegraCore "derives from iDRIVE'S optimization services," under
a new agreement with the Carrier itself-USPS- after January 201 I. (Id., §§l(a);
3(a)(l).) iDrive provided no evidence IntegraCore entered into any new agreements with

i)

USPS after January of 2011, let alone a calculation of damages under the 3 8% formula.
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Contract damages seek to place the "the aggrieved party in the same economic
position the party would have been in if the contract was not breached." Eleopus v.

Ii

McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 352, ,IIO, 145 P.3d 1157. Where iDrive has
sought as damages a measure of compensation that is not authorized by the Agreement,
iDrive does not seek the "benefit of its bargain," and has thus failed to prove damages.

See id. (proof of damages is essential element of contract claim).
IntegraCore should have been granted summary judgment on iDrive's claim for
breach of contract regarding USPS. Because the trial court provided no analysis, (Add.
D, at 4), it is unclear whether it considered iDrive's USPS claim as pled. 12

B.

iDrive's Modification Theory Also Fails as a Matter of Law.

iDrive took a startling position in response to IntegraCore's motion for summary
judgment. iDrive claimed,/or the first time in the litigation, that the parties "mutually
agreed" in either March or May of 2011 to orally "modify" or "alter" the terms the
Agreement with respect to USPS. 13 (R.2640-41, 2658, 2686-87) Notably, this eleventhhour theory admits the Agreement did not support iDrive's USPS claim as pled.
iDrive described the terms of the purported oral modification as follows:
a)

"lntegraCore would ship all USPS shipments through the iDrive USPS
account, and that iDrive would not charge the 38% savings for these
shipments because iDrive's account rates already include a markup."

12

The failure to provide any analysis to support the USPS ruling is itself error. Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a); Isakian v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277, ,I20, 34 P.3d 234.
13

iDrive inconsistently asserted both March of201 l and May of2011 as the purported
date of the oral modification. (Compare R.2658 to R.2685) This inconsistency, itself, is
compelling evidence that the purported modification never occurred.
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<ii

b)

"If IntegraCore or iDrive found a USPS option that was preferable to the
iDrive USPS account, that they would discuss the option and mutually
agree upon a change of account, if necessary."

c)

"In the event IntegraCore switched to a non-iDrive USPS agreement,
iDrive would be ... paid 38% of the savings realized comparing the rates
charged under the new USPS agreement, and the commercial being paid by
IntegraCore upon execution of the 2011 Agreement."

(R.2640-41.) As support, iDrive relied solely on a self-serving declaration from Chase.
(R.2640-41, 2739-45.)
This purported modification never occurred. Indeed, the trial court ruled that
"[n]either party has presented evidence of other terms or writings that should be
incor_porated into the Agreement." (Add. D, at 6 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, the
•

trial court denied summary judgment for IntegraCore. (Add. D, at 4.) This was error.
Not only did the trial court disregard that iDrive's USPS claim was contrary to its own
ruling that there were no modified terms, and the plain language of the Agreement, but

I)

also all of the following arguments that defeat iDrive's theory as a matter of law.

1.

iDrive only brought suit on the original 2011 Agreement

The primary legal bar to iDrive's new oral modification theory is that it was not
~

pied in iDrive's Complaint, even though the purported modification occurred almost two
years before iDrive even filed suit. (R.9-10, 13-14) To raise this theory, iDrive needed
to seek leave to amend its complaint by formal motion. Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT
App 362, if23, 199 P.3d 971. iDrive never moved to amend.
Moreover, iDrive raised this theory for the first time to try to defeat IntegraCore's
Motion for Summary Judgment, after the close of all fact and expert discovery. This
significantly prejudiced IntegraCore, and should not have been permitted. See Holmes
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Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,iJ31, 48 P.3d 895 ("A plaintiff cannot amend the

complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in
opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment."); Northern States Power
Co. v. F.T.A., 358 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir.2004) (observing parties cannot "manufacture

claims, which were not pied, late into the litigation for the purpose of avoiding summary
judgment."). By denying summary judgment for IntegraCore, the trial court effectively
granted iDrive leave to amend its Complaint, without a motion, after the close of all
discovery, over IntegraCore's objection and without regard to its prejudice. This
contradicts all of the above principles.
2.

iDrive failed to prove damages to support its modification theory

Damages are an essential element of proof for a claim of breach of contract.
Eleopus, 2006 UT App 352 at iJl 0. iDrive failed to meet its burden where it provided no

evidence of damages under the alleged oral modification theory. As indicated, Hoffinan
calculated iDrive's USPS damages only based on "the margin iDrive should have made
on the lntegraCore's USPS shipments ...." (R.2240) This is fatal to its claim because
Hoffinan did not calculate damages for USPS under the 3 8% formula iDrive now claims
was agreed-upon in the oral modification. iDrive cannot seek a measure of recovery not
supported by the contract it claims exists; contract damages are limited to the "benefit of
the bargain." Id. As it stands, iDrive has no proof of damages to support its USPS claim,
either as pied or under the purported modification.

3.

The purported oral modification would violate the statute offrauds

The Agreement is governed by the statute of frauds, see Utah Code Ann. §25-5-

so
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4(1)(a), and precludes oral modifications. (Agreement, §7(d).) Therefore, the purported
modification was also required to be in writing. Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176
(Utah Ct.App.1995). Where it is undisputed that there is no written document signed by
IntegraCore agreeing to any modification, the purported modification violates the statute
of frauds and is void.
4.

iDrive's oral modification theory fails for lack of mutual assent.

The requirement of mutual assent applies equally to contract modifications. Provo
City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., Inc., 603 P.2d 803, 806 {Utah 1979). One of the material
terms of the alleged oral agreement is that Broman "agreed that if IntegraCore or iDrive
found a USPS option that was preferable to the iDrive USPS account, that they would
discuss the option and mutually agree upon a change of account if necessary." (R.2640)
However, Broman expressly rejected the proposal in writing, stating "I don't agree with
-,

the way [the proposal] is written so let's just drop that point." (R.2744, Fact 54) The
purported modification thus fails for lack of mutual assent. Richard Barton Enterprises,
Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368,373 (Utah 1996) ("Courts may not impose a modification of
a [contract] to which the parties have not agreed and, a fortiori, may not do so when the
parties have explicitly disagreed as to the essential terms thereof.").
CONCLUSION

For each and all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rulings in the Summary
Judgment Orders and Clarification Order should be reversed, and the Court should direct
entry of summary judgment for IntegraCore on iDrive's claim for breach of contract.
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DATED this 17th day of March, 2016.

NELSON CHRISTENSEN HOLLINGSWORTH

& WILLIAMS

Isl Jeffery S. Williams
Jeffery S. Williams
QUICK LAW, P.C.

Isl Bryan L. Quick
Bryan L. Quick
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner IntegraCore, LLC
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ADDENDA

i)

A.

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Breach of Contract and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Arising from IntegraCore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement (R. 4491-97)

B.

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on IntegraCore's
First Counterclaim (Breach of Contract) and Second Counterclaim (Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) (R. 4487-90)

C.

Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs
Contract Claims in its First and Second Causes of Action (R. 4481-86)

D.

Ruling Re: Objection to Form of Summary Judgment Orders (R. 4498-4509)

E.

Pricing Optimization and Audit Service Agreement (R. 2000-03)
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PRICE PARKINSON & KERR, PLLC
David R. Parkinson (8258)
Ronald F. Price (5535)
Christopher B. Sullivan (11053)
5742 West Harold Gatty Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 530-2900
Facsimile: (801) 530-2959

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH
iDrive Logistics, LLC
Plaintiff,
vs.
IntegraCore, LLC
Defendant.

)

) [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
REGARDING BREACH OF
)
CONTRACT AND BREACH OF
) COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
)
FAIR DEALING ARISING FROM
) INTEGRACORE'S OCTOBER, 2011
)
UPS AGREEMENT
)
)
Civil No. 130400386
)
)
Judge: Fred D. Howard

On March 6, 2015, Plaintiff iDrive Logistics, LLC ("iDrive" or "Plaintiff') filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Breach of Contract and Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Arising from IntegraCore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement (the
"Motion"). After fully briefing the Motion, the parties appeared before the Court for oral
argument on August 12, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, and as set forth more fully in the
summary judgment papers filed by Plaintiff and articulated by Plaintiffs counsel at oral
argument in this matter, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
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Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court further finds that
Defendant has materially breached its contract with Plaintiff, and that Defendant IntegraCore,
LLC ("Defendant" or "lntegraCore") has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which Defendant owes to Plaintiff under the parties' contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is
hereby GRANTED, for the reasons more specifically set forth below.
Defendant argues for an interpretation of the 2011 Agreement that would allow it to
benefit from negotiations with UPS that took place in secret in October, 2011. Under the plain
and unambiguous language of the 2011 Agreement, Defendant is precluded from entering into
any agreement with any carrier without Plaintiff's knowledge, review and input:
All significant logistics decisions will flow through iDRIVE for review. As VP of
logistics, iDRIVE will also manage the contract negotiation/optimization process
with Carrier(s) ....
CUSTOMER will cooperate with iDrive in the procurement and supply of all
documentation requested by iDrive ....
CUSTOMER is obligated to notify iDRIVE of any changes to CARRIER(s)
contract or terms and conditions, sixty (60) days prior to implementation.
See 2011 Agreement, (Exhibit 3), at 11 l(a), l(c) and 3(a)(l). The Court notes that on October
~

3, 2011, during the same time period in which Defendant was having discussions with UPS
about a new agreement, Plaintiff sent a request to Defendant for information regarding the status
of discussions with UPS:
We have not talked about your UPS of FedEx for a while outside of your talks with
Shaun. We'd like to know what progress may have occurred and what you may have for
us to review and analyze.
Are you available for our call on Wednesday, and do you have specifics about UPS and
FedEx that we can discuss and see where we can help?
Email from Steve Chase to Thad Haderlie, dated October 3, 2011 (attached as Exhibit 27 to
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il)

Memorandum in Support). The record reflects that Defendant did not respond to this request, or
inform or involve Plaintiff in any discussions leading up to the October, 2011 UPS Agreement.
These actions by Defendant constitute breaches of the above-referenced provisions of the 2011
Agreement as a matter of law. The damages flowing from these breaches of contract by
Defendant will be determined at trial.
The Court finds that the 2011 Agreement also unambiguously requires Defendant to pay
(ii

Plaintiff for 38% of savings achieved with any new carrier agreement entered into during the
term of the 2011 Agreement, regardless of whether Plaintiff participates in the negotiation of
such new agreement:

@i)

AGREEMENT TERM. This agreement is considered in force from the date of
execution. For compensation purposes the term of this Agreement for Pricing
Optimization Services will be three (3) years from the date that the CUSTOMER
executes an initial or new revision of an existing Agreement(s) with the
Carrier(s). Any new agreement signed by CUSTOMER during a period of 3
years after the execution date of this agreement shall be deemed to be based on
iDRIVE'S optimization efforts. whether negotiated directly with the Carrier(s) by
iDrive, CUSTOMER or any other party and will be billable for 36 months from
new carrier agreement date. For example: If the iDrive Service Agreement was
signed January 2010 and a new FedEx agreement were put in place on March
2011, the FedEx agreement would be billable for 36 months.from March 2011. If
or when any additional modifications to the March 2011 FedEx agreement is
made during the 36 month compensation time.frame the compensation will end 36
months.from the initial March 2011 agreement. If a new UPS carrier agreement
goes into place April 2011 that UPS agreement would be billable for 36 months
from April 2011 ....
iDrive shall receive a retainer of ... ($2,185) per month .... iDRIVE shall
receive thirty-eight percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from
iDRIVE's optimization service. All improvements made to any of
CUSTOMER'S contract(s) with Carrier(s) between the signature date of this
Agreement term are considered to be the result of iDRIVE'S optimization service.
For the purpose of calculating savings from iDRIVE's optimization efforts ...
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iDrive and CUSTOMER agree that CUSTOMER'S current rates, incentives and
terms will be used as the benchmark. ..."
2011 Agreement, (Exhibit 3), at Page 2 and 13(a)(l) (underline added). The Court finds that
Defendant breached the terms of the 2011 Agreement by failing to compensate Plaintiff for 38%
of the savings actually achieved by IntegraCore as a result of the October, 2011 UPS Agreement,
and the subsequent August, 2013 UPS Agreement.
In defense of the foregoing, IntegraCore asserts that iDrive failed to perform as required
by the 2011 Agreement. However, the Court finds that as of the date of Defendant's breaches of
contract in October, 2011, iDrive had either performed, or was in the process of performing, as
required by the terms of the 2011 Agreement.
Furthermore, the Court finds that IntegraCore's argument that iDrive did not timely
perform is contrary to the plain language of the 2011 Agreement, which did not provide that time
was of the essence for performance of any obligation by Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant's
argument that Plaintiff failed to timely perform ignores that under established Utah law, even if
Defendant believed that time had expired for Plaintiff to perform some task, Defendant was, at
the very least, obligated to provide notice to Plaintiff of such belief and to allow a reasonable
time for performance before unilaterally deciding to consider the 2011 Agreement void as to
Defendant:

If no date is fixed for the delivery or performance of the contract, a reasonable
time is intended, and no default can attach until after a demand and failure or
refusal to perform.
Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 P. 958 (Utah 1900) (emphasis added); Whitney v. Perry,
208 A.O. 2d 1025, 1026 (N.Y App. Div. 1994) (same) (citations omitted); Boswell v. United
States, 123 F.2d 213,215 (5th Cir. 1941) (same). The evidence is undisputed that Defendant
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never complained about Plaintiff's performance, much less made any demand for performance
by a date certain. Defendant's failure in this regard constitutes an independent basis to reject
IntegraCore's argument of lack of performance by Plaintiff.
Finally, the Court finds persuasive the authority cited by Plaintiff for the following
proposition:
When the promisor on a contract not already fully performed on either side
continues his performance in spite of a known excuse for nonperformance, he
loses his defense of nonperformance.
H.B. Zachry Co. v. The Traveler's Indemnity Co., 391 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); B.R.
Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 103-104 (Utah App.

1988). Defendant does not attempt to distinguish this authority, but instead argues that the 2011
Agreement gave Defendant a "right" to ignore the 2011 Agreement's compensation provisions,
as follows:
iDrive also misapprehends that IntegraCore did not "continue its performance in
spite of a known excuse for nonperformance." Rather, IntegraCore exercised its
rights to refuse to compensate iDrive the 38% contingency amount for pricing
optimization services because iDrive did not perform those services.
See Opposition Memorandum, at 13. Defendant's assertion fails because the plain and

unambiguous provisions of the 2011 Agreement require Defendant to share all
information relating to discussions with UPS in October, 2011, including consideration of
the proposal Defendant received from UPS in October, 2011, with Plaintiff. The fact that
Defendant continued to accept Plaintiff's performance under the 2011 Agreement, long
after Defendant now asserts it had a known excuse for nonperformance, bars Defendant
from asserting a breach of contract by Plaintiff, prior to October, 2011. Defendant's
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defense of lack of performance by Plaintiff is undermined and, therefore, rejected, as a
matter of law for this independent reason.

** Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of the first
page***
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27 th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING BREACH OF CONTRACT ARISING FROM
INTEGRACORE'S OCTOBER, 2011 UPS AGREEMENT was served electronically via the
Court's electronic filing portal to the following:
~

Jeffery S. Williams
NELSON CHRISTENSEN
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS
68 S. Main St., #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Email: jeffw@nchwlaw.com

Bryan L. Quick
QUICK LAW, PC
9160 S. 300 W. Ste. 110
Sandy, UT 84097
Email: bryan@guicklawpc.com

QB

Edwin C. Barnes
Aaron D. Lebenta
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Email: ecb@clydesnow.com
adl@clydesnow.com

Isl David R. Parkinson
David R. Parkinson
Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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PRICE PARKINSON & KERR, PLLC
David R. Parkinson (8258)
Ronald F. Price (5535)
Christopher B. Sullivan (11053)
5742 West Harold Gatty Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 530-2900
Facsimile: (801) 530-2959
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH
iDrive Logistics, LLC

•

Plaintiff,
vs.
IntegraCore, LLC
Defendant.

i)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
IBDGMENTON
INTEGRACORE'S FIRST
COUNTERCLAIM (BREACH OF
CONTRACT)ANDSECOND
COUNTERCLAIM (BREACH OF
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING)
Civil No. 130400386
Judge: Fred D. Howard

i)

On March 6, 2015, Plaintiff iDrive Logistics, LLC ("iDrive") filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on IntegraCore's First Counterclaim (Breach of Contract) and Second
Counterclaim (Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) (the "Motion"). After fully
briefing the Motion, the parties appeared before the Court for oral argument on August 12, 2015.
For the reasons set forth below, and as set forward more fully in the summary judgment papers
filed by Plaintiff and articulated by Plaintiffs counsel at oral argument in this matter, the Court
finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to summary
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judgment as a matter of law.
The Court has granted Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
Breach of Contract and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Arising from
Integracore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement. As set forth in this Court's Order on that Motion,
in October, 2011, Defendant breached the Pricing Optimization and Audit Service Agreement,
dated January 13, 2011 ("2011 Agreement"). Under the first to breach rule, Defendant's
breaches of the 2011 Agreement relieved Plaintiff of further obligations under the 2011
Agreement, and Defendant's claims are barred for this independent reason.
The Court also finds that as of October, 2011, Plaintiff had either performed, or was in
the process of performing, as required by the terms of the 2011 Agreement.
Finally, the 2011 Agreement, at Paragraph 4, expressly and unambiguously precludes
Defendant from asserting contract-based claims for damages against Plaintiff:
Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement or otherwise, iDRJVE will not
be liable with respect to any subject matter of this Agreement under any contract,
negligence, strict liability or other legal or equitable theory (1) for any amounts ...
The Court finds that the language in the liability limitation is unambiguous and bars Defendant's
Ci)

counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
this case.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs Motion is hereby GRANTED, and Defendant's First
Counterclaim (Breach of Contract) and Defendant's Second Counterclaim (Breach of Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

Page 2 of 4
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** Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and· seal at the top of the first
page***
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27 th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INTEGRACORE'S FIRST COUNTERCLAIM (BREACH
OF CONTRACT) AND SECOND COUNTERCLAIM (BREACH OF COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) was served electronically to the following through the
Court's electronic filing system:
Jeffery S. Williams
NELSON CHRISTENSEN
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS
68 S. Main St., #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Email: jeffw@nchwlaw.com
Bryan L. Quick
QUICK LAW, PC
9160 S. 300 W. Ste. 110
Sandy, UT 84097
Email: b1:yan@quicklawpc.com
Edwin C. Barnes
Aaron D. Lebenta
CL YOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Email: ecb@c1ydesnow.com
adl@clydesnow.com

Isl David R. Parkinson
David R. Parkinson
Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
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PRICE PARKINSON & KERR, PLLC
David R. Parkinson (8258)
Ronald F. Price ( 5535)
Christopher B. Sullivan (11053)
5742 West Harold Gatty Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 530-2900
Facsimile: (801) 530-2959

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH
iDrive Logistics, LLC
Plaintiff,
vs.
IntegraCore, LLC
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT
CLAIMS IN ITS FIRST AND
SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION
Civil No. 130400386
Judge: Fred D. Howard

On March 6, 2015, Defendant IntegraCore, LLC ("IntegraCore") filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Contract Claims in its First and Second Causes of
Action. Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After fully
briefing the Motion, the parties appeared before the Court for oral argument on August 12, 2015.
For the reasons set forth below, and as set forth more fully in the summary judgment papers filed
by Plaintiff and articulated by Plaintiffs counsel at oral argument in this matter, the Court finds
that Defendant's motion is DENIED.
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The Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon the same
rationale set forth in the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Breach of Contract and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Arising
from IntegraCore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement.
Under the plain and unambiguous language of the 2011 Agreement, Defendant is
precluded from entering into any agreement with any carrier without Plaintiffs knowledge,
review and input:
All significant logistics decisions will flow through iDRIVE for review. As VP of
logistics, iDRIVE will also manage the contract negotiation/optimization process
with Carrier(s) ....
CUSTOMER will cooperate with iDrive in the procurement and supply of all
documentation requested by iDrive ....
CUSTOMER is obligated to notify iDRIVE of any changes to CARRIER(s)
contract or terms and conditions, sixty (60) days prior to implementation.

See 2011 Agreement, (Exhibit 3), at ,I,I l(a), l(c) and 3(a)(l). Defendant breached these
provisions of the 2011 Agreement in October, 2011, as a matter of law, by failing to inform and
involve Plaintiff in any discussions leading up to the October, 2011 UPS Agreement.
The Court finds that the 2011 Agreement also unambiguously requires Defendant to pay
Plaintiff for 38% of savings achieved with any new carrier agreement entered into during the
term of the 2011 Agreement, regardless of whether Plaintiff pa11icipates in the negotiation of
such new agreement:
AGREEMENT TERM. This agreement is considered in force from the date of
execution. For compensation purposes the term of this Agreement for Pricing
Optimization Services will be three (3) years from the date that the CUSTOMER
executes an initial or new revision of an existing Agreement(s) with the
Carrier(s). Any new agreement signed by CUSTOMER during a period of3
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years after the execution date of this agreement shall be deemed to be based on
iDRIVE'S optimization efforts. whether negotiated directly with the Carrier(s) by
iDrive. CUSTOMER or any other party and will be billable for 36 months from
new carrier agreement date. For example: If the iDrive Service Agreement was
signed January 2010 and a new FedEx agreement were put in place on March
2011, the FedEx agreement would be billable for 36 months from March 2011. If
or when any additional modifications to the March 2011 FedEx agreement is
made during the 36 month compensation time frame the compensation will end 36
months from the initial March 2011 agreement. If a new UPS carrier agreement
goes into place April 2011 that UPS agreement would be billable for 36 months
from April 2011 . ...
iDrive shall receive a retainer of ... ($2,185) per month .... iDRIVE shall
receive thirty-eight percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from
iDRIVE's optimization service. All improvements made to any of
CUSTOMER'S contract(s) with Carrier(s) between the signature date of this
Agreement term are considered to be the result of iDRIVE'S optimization service.
For the purpose of calculating savings from iDRIVE's optimization efforts ...
iDrive and CUSTOMER agree that CUSTOMER'S current rates, incentives and
terms will be used as the benchmark. ... "
2011 Agreement, (Exhibit 3), at Page 2 and ,3(a)(l) (underline added). The Court finds that
Defendant breached the terms of the 2011 Agreement by failing to compensate Plaintiff for 38%
of the savings actually achieved by Defendant as a result of the October, 2011 UPS Agreement,
and the subsequent August, 2013 UPS Agreement.
The Court further finds that as of the date of Defendant's breaches of contract in October,
2011, Plaintiff had either performed, or was in the process of performing, as required by the
terms of the 2011 Agreement.
For these reasons, for the reasons set forth in the Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Breach of Contract and Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Arising from IntegraCore's October, 2011 UPS Agreement, and
for the reasons set forth in the pleadings filed by Plaintiff and at oral argument in this matter,
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Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Contract Claims in its First and
Second Causes of Action is hereby DENIED.

** Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the top of the first
page***

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27 th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS IN ITS FIRST AND
SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION was served electronically via the Court's electronic filing
portal to the following:

Jeffery S. Williams
NELSON CHRISTENSEN
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS
68 S. Main St., #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Email: jeffw@nchwlaw.com

Bryan L. Quick
QUICK LAW, PC
9160 S. 300 W. Ste. 110
Sandy, UT 84097
Email: bryan@quicklawpc.com
Edwin C. Barnes
Aaron D. Lebenta
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Email: ecb@clydesnow.com
adl@clydesnow.com

Isl David R. Parkinson
David R. Parkinson
Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
September 29, 2015 08:32 AM
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4485
5 of 6

ADDENDUMD

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah
State of Utah

o/,ty•
"'fz-"'V s '"r

fl)

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

UTAHCOUNT~STATEOFUTAH
iDrive Logistics, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IntegraCore, LLC,
Defendant.

RULING RE: OBJECTION TO FORM
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDERS
Case No. 130400386

IntegraCore, LLC,

Judge Fred D. Howard

Plaintiff,
vs.
iDrive Logistics, LLC,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on IntegraCore's Objection to the Form ofthe

Summary Judgment Orders, filed August 26, 2015. iDrive Logistics ("iDrive") filed its
Response to that motion and amended orders August 2?1h, 2015. lntegraCore then filed a Reply
Memorandum on September 8, 2015 seeking further clarification on the amended orders. iDrive
filed its Response on September 14, 2015. Having reviewed the parties' filings, the Court now
makes the following Ruling.

RULING
IntegraCore objects to the summary judgment orders compiled by iDrive on both
procedural and substantive grounds. IntegraCore argues that the amended Proposed Orders filed
with the Court should have been served to it prior to filing with the Court. IntegraCore also
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argues that the amended Proposed Orders are vague, unrepresentative of the courts actual orders,
and do not address many important concerns. The following will address each concern in turn.
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7(£) a party preparing orders for a court "shall ...
serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision."
lntegraCore argues that the Court should not accept iDrive's amended Proposed Order because
they were not first served on IntegraCore. This Court respectfully disagrees and holds that the
manner in which iDrive filed the amended Proposed Orders is sufficient to satisfy Rule 7(£).
iDrive first filed its original Proposed Orders with both the Court and lntegraCore. The initial
filing and service of the Proposed Orders satisfied Rule 7(f). The amended Proposed Orders were
filed only after IntegraCore had objected to the original Proposed Orders. This Court finds that
iDrive's filing of the am.ended Proposed Orders was acceptable.
Next, IntegraCore has asked the Court to clarify the scope of its summary judgment
ruling on at least seventeen issues. The following italicized questions were posed to the Court by
lntegraCore. This Court's clarification on each matter follows the question.
1. What was the Court~ ruling regarding Mr. Chase~ failure to conduct two additional visits

over the next two quarters at IntegraCore as required by Paragraph 2 of the Agreement?
The Court ruled, and the amended Proposed Orders correctly state, that as of October
2011, "Plaintiff had either performed, or was in the process of performing, as required by the
terms of the 2011 Agreement." iDrive was not in material breach due to any failure of Mr. Chase
to conduct two additional visits. The failure to conduct two visits did not justify IntegraCore
from excluding iDrive from negotiations with UPS. IntegraCore should have communicated its
intention to find iDrive in breach. The Court is satisfied that the purposes of the additional visits

2
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were fulfilled when either Mr. Chase or Mr. Rothwell (who assumed many of the obligations of
Mr. Chase at the request of IntegraCore) made visits, phone calls, and sent email communication
to IntegraCore.
2. Which facts in the parties' Contract Summary Judgment Motions are Undisputed?
In January of 2011, iDrive and IntegraCore entered into a pricing optimization
Agreement. The Agreement required iDrive to perform pricing optimization services by assisting
lntegraCore in obtaining lower rates with their carriers and otherwise assist IntegraCore in
managing its logistics. The Agreement gave iDrive the right and the obligation to manage the
contract negotiation process with lntegraCore carriers and review significant logistics decisions
at IntegraCore. Under the 2011 Agreement, lntegraCore was to inform iDrive of new carrier
proposals and compensate iDrive for those services. lntegraCore was required to pay iDrive 38%
of any savings in a new carrier agreement regardless of any actual involvement by iDrive.
Since entering into the Agreement, iDrive has assisted IntegraCore with various projects
pursuant to the Agreement. iDrive aided in the hiring of Thad Haderlie, collected and analyzed
IntegraCore's carrier agreements, provided input on negotiation strategies, performed account
auditing, maintained communications with IntegraCore to coordinate optimization efforts, and
otherwise managed IntegraCore logistics. iDrive has presented sufficient evidence in its motions
and memoranda to dispel any reasonable doubt that it performed or was in the process of
performing its material contract obligations. Also, it is undisputed that iDrive did not perform
any negotiation services related to the UPS agreement executed October 2011.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that IntegraCore did not involve iDrive in negotiations with
UPS in October 2011 and that IntegraCore did not pay iDrive 38% of the savings from the new

3
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UPS agreement.
3. What was the Courts ruling on iDrive :S- Contract Claim with respect to USPS?
iDrive's claim with respect to USPS damages was not raised as part of its motion for
summary judgment. IntegraCore filed a motion for summary judgment incorporating a claim
related to USPS. IntegraCore's motion for summary judgment was denied, effectively preserving
the issue for future litigation and trial.
4. What was the Courts ruling on iDrive :S- claims for miscellaneous breaches ofcontract?

IntegraCore's question references iDrive's complaint which alleges the following
breaches of the 2011 Agreement:
1)lntegraCore failed to flow all significant logistics decisions through iDrive; 2)
IntegraCore failed to timely provide iDrive with information regarding changes in
its arrangements with Carriers; 3)IntegraCore failed to make all information
regarding all IntegraCore's relationships with all Carriers available to iDrive; 4)
IntegraCore failed to inform iDrive of material changes to its agreements with
Carriers, within 60 days prior to implementing those changes; 5) IntegraCore
failed to advise iDrive that changes had occurred in the amounts charged by
Carriers for services that gave rise to an obligation by IntegraCore to compensate
iDrive pursuant to the Agreement; 6) IntegraCore failed to compensate iDrive for
changes in its arrangements with Carriers as required by the terms of the 2011
Agreement; 7) IntegraCore diverted USPS shipments that were required to be
made on the iDrive negotiated USPS contract, and instead secretly and without
iDrive's knowledge or consent made those shipments using a different USPS
contract and rate; and 8) IntegraCore failed to make further payments to iDrive
for optimization services in accordance with the terms of the 2011 Agreement. 1

~

The Court finds that IntegraCore breached the contract according to counts 1-6 and 8
with respect to the UPS agreement at issue. The Agreement precluded lntegraCore from entering

into an agreement with a carrier without iDrive's knowledge, review, and input. lntegraCore
breached the contract in question by failing to apprise iDrive of negotiations with UPS.

1

Complaint filed by iDrive March 15, 2015.
4
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IntegraCore entered into a new carrier agreement with UPS without involvement from iDrive.
IntegraCore also did not pay 38% of any savings to iDrive as a result of the agreement.
IntegraCore argues that iDrive is not entitled to any payment for an agreement that they were not
involved in negotiating. While section (3)(a) of the Agreement states that iDrive will be paid
"[f]or providing the services set forth in this agreement," it also states in section (3)(a)(l) that
"all improvements made to any of CUSTOMERS contracts ... are considered to be the result of
iDrive's optimization efforts." Harmonizing these two contract clauses, the Court finds that the
improvement to IntegraCore's contract with UPS was the work of iDrive and therefore
IntegraCore must compensate iDrive for the savings resulting from that improvement. 2 This
interpretation incorporates all of the relevant terms of the Agreement into a cohesive
understanding of lntegraCore 's obligations.
The Court has not made a determination as to count seven in the complaint regarding
diversion of USPS shipments.
5. Did the Court determine that iDrive performed its obligations under the Agreement to

optimize IntegraCore :S- carrier agreements?
This Court determined that time was not of the essence in this contract for iDrive to
perform its pricing optimization obligations other than to conduct two additional visits in the
next two quarters. The amended Proposed Orders correctly state that iDrive either performed or
was in the process of performing its pricing optimization obligations during October 2011. In
order to find iDrive in breach of its contract obligations, IntegraCore was required to give notice

2

Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, ,I 19, 121 P.3d 57, 65 (stating that "A trial court must first
'attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms when determining
whether the plain language of the contract is ambiguous.") (citation omitted).
5
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to iDrive that perfonnance was untimely and allow a reasonable time for perfonnance. 3
The Court adopts the arguments made by iDrive in its motion for summary judgment
filed March 6, 2015 regarding its fulfillment of contract obligations. Specifically, iDrive fulfilled
its obligations by assisting iDrive in hiring Thad Haderlie, collecting and analyzing
IntegraCore's carrier agreements, providing negotiation strategies, performing account auditing
services, and otherwise managing the carrier accounts.
6. Did the Court determine the Agreement is fully integrated, lacks ambiguity, and is

enforceable as a matter oflaw?
The Agreement is fully integrated. Neither party has presented evidence of other terms or
writings that should be incorporated into the Agreement. The parties only dispute how the terms
should be interpreted. The amended Proposed Orders correctly state that the 2011 Agreement is
plain and unambiguous. Also, the Agreement is enforceable.
7.

If the Court determined the Agreement was fully integrated, lacked ambiguity and is
enforceable as a matter of/aw, what were IntegraCore :S- breach(es) and the performance by
iDrive?
lntegraCore breached the contract in question by failing to apprise iDrive of negotiations

with UPS. Further, IntegraCore entered into a new carrier agreement with UPS without
involvement from iDrive. IntegraCore also did not pay 38% of any savings to iDrive as a result
of the new carrier agreements.
iDrive's performance under the contract is more fully outlined in its motion for summary

judgment filed on March 6, 2015. Specifically, iDrive fulfilled its obligations by assisting iDrive

3

See Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 P. 958 (1900).
6
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in hiring Thad Haderlie, collecting and analyzing IntegraCore's carrier agreements, providing
negotiation strategies and consultation, performing account auditing services, and otherwise
managing the carrier accounts.
8. What was the Court :S- ruling with respect to the testimonies ofTed Broman, Shaun Rothwell

and Stephen Chase stating they understood and intended that the Pricing Optimization and
Audit Service Agreement required iDrive to provide additional savings lntegraCore would
GI

not have received but for iDrive s involvement?
Under section 1 of the 2011 Agreement, any new carrier contracts are deemed to have
been the result of iDrive 's "optimization" efforts regardless of any actual involvement by iDrive
in securing a more favorable contract. Section 3 of the Agreement requires IntegraCore to
compensate iDrive for any savings derived from iDrive's "optimization service." "Optimization
service" includes contracts executed by IntegraCore. Regardless of what the parties may have
understood about the mechanics of the Agreement, the plain language of the contract requires
iDrive to be compensated for contract improvements.

9. Did the Court rule that the undisputedfactual record showed IntegraCore engaged in secret
negotiations with UPS?
The amended Proposed Orders correctly state that IntegraCore did not inform or involve
iDrive of discussions with UPS in October 2011. The Court finds that Mr. Chase contacted
IntegraCore and attempted to participate in negotiations on the UPS contract. Nevertheless,
IntegraCore initiated negotiations and reached an agreement with UPS without iDrive's
participation.
l 0. What was the Courts ruling on iDrive s failure to optimize lntegraCore :S- carrier contract

7
~
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with other carriers besides UPS?
As noted above in response to question #5, the Court finds that iDrive either performed or
was in the process of performing its contract obligations. The material terms of the Agreement
did not have a timeframe for completion. Since time was not of the essence in the Agreement, the
Court finds that iDrive is not in breach due to any possible failure of iDrive to optimize
IntegraCore's various carrier agreements.
11. What was the Court :S, ruling on iDrive :S claim for breach ofthe implied covenant ofgood
faith and/air dealing?
Under Utah law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all contracts. 4 This
covenant requires each party in an agreement to refrain from intentionally doing anything to
impede the other party's right to receive the benefit of the agreement. 5 Furthermore, Utah law
provides, "one party cannot by willful act or omission make it impossible or difficult for the
other to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance as a defense."6
The Court finds that IntegraCore had an express duty to allow iDrive the benefit of the
right to manage negotiations between UPS and lntegraCore. lntegraCore also had a duty to
provide notice of proposals received by IntegraCore so that iDrive could perform its optimization
services. The Court finds that IntegraCore breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by not notifying iDrive of the UPS negotiations, failing to allow iDrive to manage the
October, 2011 negotiations, and failing to provide iDrive with a copy of the proposal sent by
UPS to IntegraCore. This breach deprived iDrive of the contractual right to manage negotiations
See St. Benedict s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991 ).
s Id.
6
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979).

4
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and perform its optimization obligations.
12. On what basis did the Court grant iDrive ~ motion for summary judgment on lntegraCore s

contract counterclaims?
The Court finds that iDrive had either performed or was in the process of performing its
obligations under the Agreement. Time was not of the essence for performance of the material
terms of the Agreement. IntegraCore's counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are barred because iDrive was not in breach of
the Agreement.
13. What is the Court :S- ruling regarding the requirement to establish causation in connection

with iDrive :S- claimed damages?
The question of causation in connection with damages was not ruled on by the Court.
Causation needs to be proven along with damages at trial.
14. How did the Court construe the compensation and optimization terms ofthe Agreement?
Section (3)(a) of the Agreement states that iDrive will be paid "[f]or providing the
services set forth in this agreement." Section 3(a)(l) of the Agreement also provides that "all
improvements made to any of CUSTOMERS contracts ... are considered to be the result of
iDrive's optimization efforts." Harmonizing these two contract clauses, the Court finds that the
improvement to IntegraCore 's contract with UPS was the work of iDrive and, therefore,
IntegraCore must compensate iDrive for the savings resulting from that improvement.
15. How did the Court resolve the parties competing interpretation regarding the use ofthe term

"derives" in the Agreement?
The Agreement clause in questions reads, "iDRIVE shall receive thirty-eight percent
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(38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from IDRIVE'S optimization service." 7 The
Court construes the term "derives" according to its ordinary, natural, and plain meaning. The
definition of derive is ''to take, receive, or obtain especially from a specified source." 8 Since all
agreements entered into by lntegraCore are deemed to be the work of iDrive, the Court reads the
Agreement as allowing iDrive to collect 38% of savings from all contract improvements
regardless of whether or not iDrive actually performed optimization services.

16. What were the scope and requirements of iDrive sfiduciary obligations to IntegraCore by
virtue ofMr. Chases position of VP ofLogistics and agent of IntegraCore?
The Court noted at oral argument on August 12, 2015 that iDrive did not owe IntegraCore
:fiduciary duties. IntegraCore argues that because Steven Chase was the VP of Logistics for
IntegraCore, iDrive became an agent of IntegraCore and owed them :fiduciary duties. While an
officer or director of a corporation may owe fiduciary duties to that corporation,9 iDrive's
obligations to IntegraCore are limited to those enumerated in the Agreement.
17. Did the Court rule that IntegraCore waived the defense ofnonperformance?
Under Utah law, waiver of a right occurs when a party, conscious of an existing right,
unequivocally evinces "an intent to waive" the right that is inconsistent with any other intent. 10
In the instant case, IntegraCore waived its defense of nonperformance by continuing to accept
services from iDrive and conducting its business as if the Agreement were still in effect.
After October, 2011, lntegraCore continued to use iDrive's shipping account, receive
iDrive's auditing services, and communicated to iDrive through various emails and phone calls
7

2011 Agreement,§ 3(a)(l).
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, Derive, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/derive.
9
C&YCorp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
10
B.R. Woodward Mktg., Inc. v. Collins Food Serv., Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
8
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that the Agreement was still in effect. The Court finds this conduct to be an unequivocal
manifestation of intent to keep the Agreement in full force and effect. IntegraCore is not
permitted to silently and unilaterally declare iDrive to be in breach of the Agreement while still
receiving benefits from iDrive. IntegraCore is therefore barred from asserting a defense of
nonperformance.
Conclusion
el)

In conclusion, this Court finds the amended Proposed Orders filed by iDrive to be
sufficient to represent adequately this Court's ruling on the issues as supplemented by this ruling.
Accordingly, IntegraCore's Objection is overruled and iDrive's amended Proposed Orders are
entered by the Court.

DATED this

,z,

day of September, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
G\NJJ..L

Ho.
District o
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the

.:2.et" day of September, 2015 to the following at the addresses indicated:

Jeffrey S. Williams
68 S. Main St. # 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Edwin C. Barnes
201 S Main St 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Bryan Quick
9160 S 300 W Suite 110
Sandy, UT 84097
David R. Parkinson
5742 W Harold Gatty Dr
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

--,,,,

Deputy Court Clerk

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4509

(j

ADDENDUME

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lfj

LOCIS'flCS

Pricing Optimization and Audit Service Agreement
This Agreement is hereby entered into between 1Drive Logistics, LLC ("IDRIVE"), and lntegraCorc.
("CUSTOMER"), on lhe following terms and conditions
Note. For purposes of this Agreement, the term ·carrier(sr shall mean United Parcel Service. Inc .
Fe_dEx C~rporation. United States Postal Service, DHL International Ltd., Loss than Truckload (LTL)
freight earners, and Truckload (TL) carriers together with their subsidinnes, and any other identified focal.
regional, national, or international carriers.

1. General
iDRIVE is a logistics management firm that endeavors to provide CUSTOMER with services to
reduce transportation expenses and Improve transportation practices.
(a) Pricing Optimization Service. CUSTOMER appoints iORIVE (Stephen Chase or mutually
agreed upon person) as Vice President (VP} of Logistics and is tasked to help CUSTOMER
with all modes of transporation and wi!t report directly to Ted Broman, CUSTOMER CEO
and/or OWNER AJI significant logistics decisions wlll now through iDRIVE for review. As VP
or logistics. iDrive will also manage the contract negotiation/optimization process with
Carrier(s). as well as the contract maintenance process. on CUSTOMER'S behalf. This
process Includes collecting and analyzing CUSTOMER'S current parcel shipping data. pricing
and Carrier contracts; establishing negotiation parameters wilh the CUSTOMER; Issuing
Request For Proposals (RFP} to the Carriers; collecting and analyzing the Carriers'
responses to the RFP; negotiating pricing, terms and conditions With the Carriers; presenting
analysis on Carrier proposals lo the CUSTOMER. Final selection of a Carrier(s) is the
CUSTOMER'S decision. Savings attributed to iDRIVE'S contract negotiation with the carriers
will be determined by comparing incentives currently being offered to CUSTOMER under the
contract(s) from the Carrier(s) In effect on the date of this Agreement, less the new incentives
achieved from the Carrier(s) after the date hereof and will be calculateo based on
CUSTOMER'S actual shipping data.
(b) Audit Service· CUSTOMER authorizes iDRIVE lo audit CUSTOMER'S invoices from Parcel
Carrier{s) during the term of this Agreement. Audit services are to include; auditing
CUSTOMER'S Carner(s) invoices. both pre and post payment. in a timely manner. in
accordance with the contractual Agreements between CUSTOMER and Carrier(s}.
CUSTOMER agrees to cancel with current provider and have full 1Dnve implementabon
completed prior lo Februart 15, 2011.
(c) CUSTOMER will cooperate with 1DRIVE in the procurement and supply of all documentation
requested by iORIVE. including wayb1lls. airb1lls, manifest data. confidential discount and
contract rate information, and information necessary tor a proper and accurate pre and post
audit of Carrier(s) invoices. CUSTOMER shall determine credit rules or Carrier(s) used. •
CUSTOMER is obligated to notify iDRIVE of any changes to Carrier(s) contract or terms and
conditions, sixty (60) days prior to implementation.
{d) CUSTOMER is to notify Carrier(s) that original electronic invoices are to be sent to iDRIVE. in
a timely manner. CUSTOMER will notify Carrier(s) and coordinate necessary documentation
appointing iDRIVE as the primary point of contact for Carrier(s) invoicing communication.
(e) iDRIVE will process claims for invoice inaccuracies and billing errors, track shipments and
process claims for on-lime service failures and manifested. not shipped packages on behalf
of CUSTOMER'S Account(s). defined as all accounts 1nvo1ced to the CUSTOMER.
(!) iDRIVE will provide CUSTOMER with standard reports detailing invoice inaccuracies. billing
errors, on-time service failures. manifasted. not shipped packages and rate savings.
(g) •DRIVE will supply to CUSTOMER on a timely basis a remittance advice document. itemizing
au charges due Carrier(s) and iDRIVE.

ICrivo Logistics, LLC, Confidontfal (01/2.t/2008)
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Agreement Term
This agreement ls consldered In force from the date of execution. For compensation purposes the
term of this Agreement for Pricing Optimization Services will be three (3) years from the date that the
CUSTOMER executes an inlUal or new revision of an existing Agreement(s) with the Carrier(s). Any
new Carrier agreement signed by CUSTOMER during a period of 3 years after the execution date of
this agreement shall be deemed to be based on iDRIVE's optimization efforts, whether negotiated
directly With the Csrrier(s) by iORIVE. CUSTOMER or any other party and will be blHable for 36
months from new carrier agreement date. For example: If the /Drive Se,vics Agmement was signed
January 2010 and a new Fed& agreement were put In place on March 2011, the Fec:Jf=J( agreement
would be billable for 36 months from March 2011, If or When any additional modifications to the March
2011 FedEx agmement is made during the 36 month compensation lime frame the compensation wDI
end 36 months from the initial March 2011 agreeemBnt If a new UPS carrier agreement goes into
place April 2011 that UPS agreement would be billable for 36 months trom April 2011. Al the end of
the 36 month compensation tfmeframe a new baseffne would be astabtlshed from the current carrier
agreement(s) to determine new compensation. The initfal term will be renewed tar successive one
(1) year tenns unless either party notifies the other party. at least ninety (90) days prior to expiration
of lhe current term that the Agreement will not be renewed. The term of the agreement for Audit
Service will begtn no rater than February 15, 2011 and will be three years from Audit start date. The
initial term wfff be renewed for successive one (1) year terms unless either party notifies the other
party. at feast ninety (90) days plior to expfratfan of the current term that the Agreement will not be
renewed. Upon renewal contingency rate for Audit will be reduced to 38%.

2. Designation as Vice President of Logistics
CUSTOMER appoints IDRIVE (Stephen Chase ar mutually agreed upon person) as its Vice President of
Logistics to assist CUSTOMER with all modes of transporation. including the right to negotiate
Carrrer(s) contracts and access shipping data and information related to shipments made by
CUSTOMER. In this capacity, iORIVE shall have all powers as may be necessary or expedient to
carry cut the purposes of. and the transactions contemplaled in, thrs Agreement
Outflne of Expectabons for VP of LoglsftJcs
• Spend 2 days in lntegraCore·s Operatfons reaming current logistics pradices and operations
• Hefp find. interview and recruit Director of Logistics as needed
o Support and direct as needed him/her as needed
• Provide. as needed, recommendatJons fer logistics changes such as:
o Carrier providers
o Optimization of Carrier agreements
_, OpUmization of Distribution Models
:J
RedfstribuUoo of work assignments for cu"ent staff
.;: Logistics Technofogies
• Wom directly with carriers regarding carrier agreements, services and strategfc changes
• Conduct 2 additional visits over the next 2 quarters
o If CUSTOMER requests or requires additional visits, CUSTOMER would mcur travel
casts
• Monitor transportation cost trends by mode and by carrier
3. Service Fees, Invoices and Payment
(a) iORNE Fees. For providing the services set forth by this agreement, iDRIVE shall be receive
from CUSTOMER the following:
1. pricing Optimization Service: !DRIVE shall receive a retainer of two
thousand one hundred and eighty.five dollars ($2,185) per month ror seven
(7) months beginning February 1, 2011. iDRIVE shall receive thirty•eight
percent (38%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from iDRIVE'S
opdmiZation service All improvements made lo any of CUSTOMER's

IDrtve Logistics, U.C, ConfldenUal (01.12412008)
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contract{s) with Carrier(s) between the signature date on this Agreement and
the end of the Agreement term are considered to be the result of iORIVE'S
optimization service. For the purposes of calculating savings from iORIVE'S
optimization efforts with the Camer(s), iORIVE and CUSTOMER agree that
CUSTOMER1S current rates. Incentives and terms will be used as the
benchmark. CUSTOMER'S benchmart< data will be used as the basis for
calculating savings atbibutable to iDRIVE'S Pricing OptJmlzation service.
2. l\udjt SfflYlce· iDRlVE shall receive three thousand eight hundred twenty-five
dollars ($3,825) due upon signing of this agreement iDRIVE shall receive
forty-one percent (41%) of savings that the CUSTOMER derives from
iORIVE'S audit services. Upon Renewal of agreement conUngency rate
Is reduced to 38%
(b) Custgm Reports: Any report, other than iORIVE'S standard reports. will require a statement
of work as In addendum A ·statement of work• will be submitted for approval to build
additional custom report(s).
(c) IDRIVE Invoices. iORIVE shall provide invoices to CUSTOMER for iDRIVE Service Fees,
each month.
(d) Payment to iDRIYE. CUSTOMER will remit fuU payment to fORfVE withln 15 days from date
of invoice, for aH services performed by iDRIVE under terms of this agreement. A fee of 1.5%
will be charged for late payments beyond fifteen days, with an 18% APR on any unpaid

balance.
4. Umlt of Liability and Force Majeure.
Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement or otherwise, !DRIVE will not be Hable with respect to
any subject matter of this Agreement under any contract, negligence, strict liability or other legal or
equitable theory (I) for any amounts or (II) for any punitive. special, incidental or consequential
damages or lost data or (Ill) for cost of procurement of substitute goads. technofogy or services or
(IV) for loss or corruption of data or interruption of use. This section does not limit fiabfllty fer bodily
Injury of a person. fDrive makes no warranty with respect to any technclogy, goods, services, rights or
other subject matter of this Agreement and hereby disclaims warranties of merchantability, fitness, for
a particular purpose and non-infringement with respect to any and all of the foregoing.

Neither party hereto shall be responsible for any failure to perfonn Its obligations under this
Agreement (other than obligations to pay money or obligations under section 5) If such failure is
caused by acts that are beyond the reasonable control of such party; e.g. acts Gad, war. acts of
terrorism. strikes, revolutions, lack or raHure of lransportatton facJlities, laws or govemmenlaf
regulation or other such causes. Obligations hereunder, however, shall in no event be excused but
shall be suspended only until the cessation or any cause of such faUure. In the event that such force
maJeure should obstruct performance or thls Agreement for more than six (6) months. the parties
hereto shall consult with each other to determine whether this Agreement should be modified. The
party facing an event of force majeure shall use its reasonable endeavors in order to remedy that
situation es well as to minimize its effects. A case of rorce majeure shall be notified to the other party
by facsimile within five (5) days after its occurrence and shall be confirmed by a letter.

or

s. Confidential Information
iDRIVE and CUSTOMER agree to not disclose any confidenliaJ inrormation leamed about the other
party during the course of their relationship to ~ other party. including but not fimited to, this
Agreement. CUSTOMER'S confidential information shall not be used for any purpose other than
ouUined In this Agreement.
~

IOrtve Logf&tlC$, LLC, Conffdentlal (0112412008)
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7.

Other
(a) This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State
of Ufah, without regard to the conflict of laws provisions thereof.
(b) iDRIVE operates as an independent contractor and agent, not as an employee of
CUSTOMER.
{c) Unless otherwise agreed In writing, this Agreement, or other rights or obflgatlons hereunder
may not be assigned, delegated er otherwise transferred by CUSTOMER without the prior
written consent of iDRIVE, which will not be unreasonably withheld.
{d) This Agreement. tncluding the Attachments hereto and !DRIVE poUcies referenced herein.

constitutes the entfre Agreement between IDRIVE and CUSTOMER concerning the subject
hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous Agreements between the parties,
whether written or oral. This Agreement may not be waived, repealed, altered or amended in
whole or in part except by an instrument in writing executed by authorized representatives of
each of the parties.
(e) Following 1 month iDRNE may use CUSTOMER'S name and/or logo In marketing materials
and may. on a periodic basis, use CUSTOMER contact as a reference.
This Agreement will be consrdered executed and in force upon the date of signature by CUSTOMERS
authorized representative.

iORIVE lOGISJl~

CUSTOMER:
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